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WESTERN POLICY AT THE CROSS ROADS

BY W. FRIEDMANN

THE memory of the events between 1935 and 1939 largely accounts for the grim determination with which the western democracies have taken up the challenge of the Korean invasion, in face of dangers and trials greater than those threatening in 1939. Yet in the choice of means, and in the appreciation of the world situation, western policy is in grave danger of making some irreparable mistakes. This is due, it seems, to the illusion that history is repeating itself ; that the communist challenge to-day is in every way comparable to the fascist challenge of pre-war days ; that the west is to-day in a position to stop aggression wherever it occurs, and that the Asian problems of to-day are comparable to the European problems of pre-war days.

There has been a clear act of aggression. Because of the post-war quarrels between the Allied powers, it is an aggression by one State against another, rather than a civil war. Because of Russia's tactical blunder in staying away from the Security Council, the Council was able to take a valid decision, although its moral authority was weakened by its dependence on the vote of the Nationalist Chinese delegate as the sole representative of China. In the world which we hope for, armed aggression will be met automatically by United Nations forces under international command, ready for action and equipped with weapons superior to those of any single State. But the reality of to-day is far different.

Let us look back at the comparable situations before the war. When Japan invaded Manchuria in 1931 the League of Nations could only register moral indignation. It would have been hopeless even to attempt to stop the Japanese by force. True, the state of western armaments was far worse than to-day, and the United States was only a friendly observer. But no imminent military danger threatened the western powers, as it does to-day, in Europe and the Middle East. In 1935, on the other hand, an almost miraculous opportunity presented itself to the League of Nations to restore its tottering authority and to preserve peace. The Abyssinian invasion was undertaken by a power singularly weak in strategic raw materials, and dependent for its success on the unhindered passage of its transports through the Suez Canal. It was faced with the combined naval

strength of Britain, France and the smaller Mediterranean powers, as well as the strong moral opposition of the United States Government. The League almost rose to this occasion, until weak or corrupt politicians, the pressure of economic interests, and downright escapism combined to defeat it. The consequences became immediately apparent with the Franco revolt of 1936. Unlike Abyssinia, this produced some cleavage between right-wing and left-wing opinion. Also it was technically a civil war. However, it was plain to everybody that behind Franco's revolt stood Hitler and Mussolini, and, for that reason alone, combined western action to stop at least the undisguised intervention of both Germany and Italy would have been both possible and essential. Lastly, the dismemberment of Czechoslovakia contrasts starkly with that of Southern Korea in several respects. Here was one of the most progressive democracies of Europe, a State well armed and willing to defend itself. Moreover, most historians now agree that Soviet Russia at that time was genuinely willing to try out joint action with the west, just as she was ready, a little later, to try out collaboration with the Nazi government.

In these three cases—not to speak of Hitler's Rhineland reoccupation of 1936—the moral and legal situation was clear, and the military and political chances of a western answer to aggression far stronger than they are at present in Korea. One need not be a professional strategist to see that the communist bloc to-day has all the initial advantages of Hitler's Germany, on a global scale. It is a compact group of nations, ranging from south-east Europe to Mongolia, and able to strike out in any direction with overwhelming land forces. Moreover it can tie up a disproportionate amount of western strength by attacking in territories suitable for guerrilla warfare, and in conditions relatively invulnerable to air power. The communist powers can therefore make the maximum use of their vast resources of manpower, helped as they are by the technical direction and equipment from Soviet Russia.

If the Far East is one of the main centres of pressure, compelling the western powers to use disproportionate resources at great distance from their bases, there are at least two other major danger spots: western Europe and the Middle East. Few will deny that, if a choice has to be made, the defence of both Europe and the Middle East is more immediately vital to the survival of the western democracies. A Russian conquest of western Europe would destroy the heart of the Atlantic Treaty group, and add vast resources to the communists. It would eliminate all nations, outside the United States and the British Commonwealth, which resist Communism with conviction because the vast majority of their people, including the organized working class, have gained freedom, responsibility and an immense improvement of their economic conditions by democratic processes,

and have much to lose but little to gain by turning communist. Hardly less disastrous would be the elimination of Tito's Yugoslavia, precisely because it is a "deviationist" communist State which has exposed Soviet imperialism and the impossibility of combining Cominform policy with national independence. The defence of the Middle East is ideologically far more precarious. Among a multitude of weak or corrupt governments, only Turkey and Israel can be regarded as both vigorous and democratic. But even if the Middle East as a whole is an ideological vacuum, its defence is essential to the preservation of Europe, because of its oil as well as its strategical position. Nor is there at present any significant communist movement in that area.

A third key-area and possible storm centre is in the south-west Pacific, where Pakistan would be the first victim of an attack from Soviet-controlled Asia. The preservation of the incalculable benefits gained by the wisdom of British and, more belatedly, Dutch, policy in abandoning control of India, Pakistan, Ceylon, and Indonesia is absolutely vital. The Governments of these States, to which Burma may be added with some reservations, represent some 500,000,000 Asians. Their Governments are, on the whole, now friendly to the west, ready for collaboration, and generally inclined toward the democratic rather than the totalitarian way of life. As long as they support the west, there is an effective answer to the communist claim that Communism alone can deliver the masses of Asia from western imperialism and social reaction. But the support or stability of these Asian Governments cannot be taken for granted. They are as yet socially unstable, economically vulnerable (especially India), and by no means willing to support the western powers in a policy of indiscriminating support for all anti-communist Governments in the Far East.

It is for the western powers to make a sober and utterly realistic assessment of their political as well as their military resources. It is in the light of both these factors that they must assess their priorities, and make sure that they will not sacrifice the greater for the lesser objective.

The first fact, which only wishful thinking could deny, is that the western powers cannot at present effectively defend all the areas threatened by attack. They must make a choice, and for reasons given earlier, it would be fatal to denude the defence of western Europe or the Middle East for the sake of Korea, Indo-China, or Chiang Kai-shek's régime. It is perhaps still a little difficult for European and American statesmen and publicists to grasp, not only in theory, but in practice, how virtually the world scene is being affected by the emergence of a number of Asian nations as subjects rather than objects of world politics. And this is closely connected

with what, to the present writer, appears to be a dangerous American fallacy in the appreciation of the appeal of Communism in Asia.

Europe was the cradle of Communism. But to-day, as post-war history has shown, Communism can make further penetrations in Europe only by force, not by appeal to the people. While the Communist Party is still strong in France and Italy, its influence has receded, as the objects of Soviet policy became clearer, and the economic condition of these nations improved, thanks largely to Marshall Aid. Above all, only a minority of the working classes to-day support Communism in Europe. But the very conditions which weaken Communism in the west, favour it in Asia. Communist Governments everywhere are government by a strictly organized, purposeful, and ruthless minority. But the peoples of Asia, especially of the Far East, have seldom known anything but autocratic government. In that respect, Communism is at least no worse than the Governments they are used to. But in many respects, it is better because it is more efficient, and less corrupt.

Above all, it can to-day use in Asia, especially in the Far East, the twin appeals of nationalism and social reform. Nationalism is to-day a live enough issue in Asia to make an effective appeal. And in such countries as China, Korea, and Indo-China, it can be effectively directed against the west, which has, in these countries, identified itself with inefficient, oppressive, or corrupt Governments, which have little popular support. Asian Communism does not at present advocate the socialization of land or industry. It concentrates on re-distribution of land, abolition of middlemen and absentee landlords, and control of trade. This has an immediate appeal, especially when contrasted with the corruption and the reactionary policies of the Governments of Chiang Kai-shek or Syngman Rhee. If the western powers had no other task but to stop communist advances in the Far East, it would tax their resources strongly. For they would have to do it overwhelmingly by force. But they have urgent and far more vital tasks elsewhere. It would, I believe, be sheer folly to imagine that a few divisions and squadrons in Korea or Indo-China could permanently halt the advance of Communism in the Far East, unless and until progressive and efficient non-communist Asian Governments could take up the challenge. Yet it looks as if western policy, especially in the United States, has been manoeuvred into a position where it is pledged to defend governments hardly worthy of the support of democracy. The French fight for the Emperor Bao Dai, who has been reported to be on holiday in France, and General MacArthur—acting possibly on his own authority—has promised support to Chiang Kai-shek, in terms which the Chinese Nationalists have interpreted as a general alliance.

The dangers of such a development, if it goes unchecked, can hardly

be exaggerated. One consequence will be the weakening or withdrawal of the support of non-communist Asia, and especially of Pandit Nehru's India. His hope that India may be the leader of a neutral bloc, mediating between the great powers, is probably Utopian. But his redefinition of Indian policy in the present situation is perfectly understandable. He supports United Nations resistance against unprovoked aggression, but he does not support any western policy which aligns itself with anti-communist government as such, and opposes the extension of Communism by means other than armed force. The two objectives are in danger of being confused in policy, greatly to the detriment of the cause of the democracies.

Behind this looms an even greater danger. The North Atlantic Treaty and the Council of Europe represent on the whole what they purport to be : the core of the remaining democratic, free and socially progressive world. But in Asia, western policy is in danger, not only of using up precious strength, against very heavy odds, but of coming to adopt, by default, a policy of resistance by military force alone. This is not a good enough or effective answer to the challenge of Communism, which, in Asia at any rate, has something more positive to offer. It does not matter what Communism will ultimately bring to the peasants of Asia, but what appeal it exercises at present by comparison with the western policy.

Mr. Acheson has repeatedly spoken of a policy of "agreement from strength". Mr. Churchill sees apparently the only possibility of an understanding with Russia in a general division of spheres. "Agreement from strength" certainly pre-supposes will to resist, and the collective organization of western defence. But it also means realization of limitations, and in particular the still painful insight that the west can no longer control Asia by either military or economic power.

Some practical conclusions emerge. If military support in Korea, Formosa, or Indo-China should threaten to weaken the defence of Europe and the Middle East, it should be given up, even at the cost of "loss of face" (a phrase which seems to have taken a fatal hold on western statesmen and publicists). The continued recognition of Chiang Kai-shek's China as the only representative of China cannot alter the reality of the situation. At most, military support for Formosa should be strictly limited to the duration of the Korean war, without being turned into a general alliance with Chiang Kai Shek. Finally, the overriding test for western policy in Asia should not be whether a particular government is democratic, communist, socialist, or conservative, but whether it is good enough to have a minimum of confidence and stability. This is worth very many divisions.

(Dr. Friedmann occupies the Chair of Public Law at the University of Melbourne.)

COLLECTIVE DEFENCE OR SUCCESSIVE DESTRUCTION

BY W. T. WELLS, M.P.

WHILE Mr. Churchill's view that a general war is not imminent is probably shared by the leaders of all parties, in spite of Mr. Shinwell's proper if somewhat audacious assertion that he was taking no chances, an increased measure of preparedness for war at an early date is an elementary precaution, the need for which only fellow-travellers and the conscientious pacifists would dispute. The only questions are, in effect, the extent to which political and economic considerations must be subordinated to purely strategic ones, and, given a decision on this fundamental matter, how the organization of defence is to proceed.

The conflict between a policy which is best calculated to combat the specious claims of the communists, on the one hand, and a clear-cut strategic conception which is likely to facilitate the technical tasks of the admirals, generals, and air marshals, on the other, manifests itself in Asia, in Europe, and even in Africa. The most formidable problem arises in connection with Formosa. Serious doubts have been expressed on legal grounds, by persons whose qualifications to discuss matters of law appear to be exiguous, about the propriety of the American intervention to prevent the occupation of Formosa by the forces of the present Government of China; these doubts appear to be ill-founded, and the real question is not legal but political. None but the strategically, and, indeed politically illiterate can suppose that, if a general war were to develop between the United States and Communist China, it would be possible for us to remain neutral at the same time as our forces were co-operating with the Americans in Korea. But, as Mr. Crossman so brilliantly pointed out in the course of the most recent House of Commons debate on defence, it is not necessarily wise or right to behave in peace as in war. In the long run, successful resistance to Soviet aggression in Asia depends on the Asiatics. Any action that savours of, or can plausibly be misrepresented as, imperialism, or as support of the decadent government of General Chiang Kai-shek, may gain adherents for the Cominform; and the appearance of an alliance between the United States and Great Britain to prevent China from acquiring an island that the Allies had formerly by a decision of the Cairo Conference in 1943, decided should revert to Chinese sovereignty, would clearly alienate India and all those

forces that our Asiatic policy since the war has made more friendly to Great Britain than Asiatic opinion has been since 1918.

Somewhat similar problems arise in Europe. It can be argued, and with considerable weight, that the most secure, perhaps the only secure, base from which to conduct Continental operations against any future Russian aggression is to the west of the Pyrenees ; and from this point of view an understanding with the Government of Spain is clearly to be desired. But, hard though it is to read the minds of the Politbureau, it is probable that the rulers of the Kremlin would tend to welcome rather than regret any such development, for General Franco's Government is held in detestation by the left, and to enrol the Caudillo among the upholders of the North Atlantic Pact would lose the latter the sympathy of those many Continental socialists whose increasing detachment from Marxism is one of the most important features of the European political scene.

And there is Germany, on whose participation in the defence of the west Mr. Boothby has recently been insisting at Strasbourg. In the May 1950 number of *THE FORTNIGHTLY*, the present writer expressed the following views : " The right balance is singularly hard to strike, but neither determination wholly to exclude nor haste to embrace seem to be at all appropriate. The Germans must be given some hope of attaining equality, but . . . it is on France, the creator, rather than on Germany, the destroyer, of the old European community that the new must be founded . . . and the Germans in fact, must work their passage."

There seems to be little need for revising these words ; yet the danger now is obviously more acute than at Easter, when they were written, and if we should not still hasten to embrace, the arguments against the total exclusion of western Germany from participation in the defence of Europe are clearly more cogent to-day.

These are some of the political problems that confront those who have to organize the defence of the free world. The time to subordinate long-term political objectives to the immediate requirements of a war strategy has not yet come, but it may not be long deferred, and while the present is a time for elasticity and for a deferment of certain decisions, two considerations should be borne in mind. First, that in times of danger nothing convinces waverers more than military strength ; secondly, that while policy should still aim at securing adhesions to the cause of the United Nations and defections from the ranks of their opponents, too much should not be staked on the chance of present opponents becoming future allies. Potential Titoists, just as the Germans, must work their passage ; it would be wrong to run too great a risk of offending friends on the off-chance of enticing Mao-Tze-tung to align himself with our cause at some future time.

In the field of domestic preparations for meeting the present situation, the Government has already announced a programme that will involve the expenditure of an additional £100,000,000 on defence. While it is easy to exaggerate the deleterious effects on our economy of such a measure and, as *The Economist* pointed out in a recent article, the proportion that defence expenditure bore to the national income before this recent increase in the former was only the same as in the comparatively tranquil days of the early 'twenties, it must be remembered that our economy to-day is already strained to the full and that only a marked increase in productive capacity and production can enable us to withstand the demands of rearmament without jeopardizing that economic recovery which is so potent a bulwark against communist aggression both at home and abroad. The Government's investment programme since the war has laid the foundations of such an increase, and signs seem to be evident that help may be forthcoming from the buoyant economy of the United States to redress the balance; yet none the less some measure of sacrifice, open or concealed, will clearly be required, and it will be difficult to meet the demands that will be made on our economy without a further measure of inflation.

Yet even these serious economic dangers pale into insignificance when compared with the lack of balance, admitted on all sides, between the military strength of the potential aggressors and that of the North Atlantic powers—it is possible, no doubt, to paint an exaggerated picture of the Soviet Union's strength. The quality of its divisions is sure to be uneven, and many of them must clearly be composed of garrison troops. The threat they constitute is on any showing formidable, and those who control them have the great advantage of being able to decide when and where to strike; and they have, further, the choice of making open war or of continuing to distort the economies of the western nations, and so of enhancing the superficial attractions of their own system, for an indefinite period. On the whole there seems little reason to suppose that the men who preferred humiliation to war over the blockade of Berlin in 1948 will choose open war in 1950 or 1951; and that, too, is a factor that should not, and surely will not, be forgotten, in making the political and economic decisions that have to be made. Whatever form the threat takes, it can be met without ruin and disaster only by international action: by the creation of a unified command, by the standardization of weapons, by the pooling of resources, and by the international organization of war production. The task presents immense difficulties, and to enhance them by a lack of sense of proportion would be criminal. If, in the process of carrying it out, the conception of national sovereignty comes to a natural or even a violent death, how many dogs in reality will bark at its dissolution?

CHANGE IN TURKEY

BY MALCOLM BURR

SINCE the proclamation of the Republic in 1923 Turkey has been governed by a single party. Under the circumstances at the time no other course was possible. It called itself *Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi*, the Republican People's party, to stress its fundamental characteristics. The first chapter of the Organic Law states that the sovereignty belongs unconditionally and without restriction to the nation and recites the principles, the Six Arrows of Atatürk, that is that the State is republican, revolutionary, national, of the people, lay and *étatiste*. The party included virtually all the educated people in the country and its worst critics are bound to admit that it has achieved some remarkable results.

With the recession of Ottomanism into history, however, the revolutionary conception of the party has been weakened. If there were a revolution in Turkey to-day it would not be by the party, but against it. But until 1945 it was paramount. The electoral system rendered any peaceful alternative impossible. The first effects of the restlessness of the younger men was seen when candidates not appointed by the party were allowed to stand for election. Great excitement was caused by a handful of by-elections, when in Istanbul alone nearly a hundred candidates came forward, including several freaks. The next step was the abolition of the system of election by second degree.

Then fissiparous tendencies became apparent within. In an animated debate upon the budget in 1945, when the high cost of living had provoked wide discontent, no less than 24 deputies put very pointed questions and there was something like heckling. Shükrü Saraciglu, then Prime Minister, called for a vote of confidence—in a single party Parliament. Seven voted against. Their names were Celal Bayar, Adnan Menderes, Fuat Köprülü, Refik Koraltan, Hikmet Bayur, Recep Peker and Emin Sazak. Very outspoken was Hikmet Bayur : " If our statesmen cannot put a stop to robbery and profiteering, let them clear out and make way for someone who can." There was no liberty of the press and the Government was oligarchic. The party held that the country was not ripe for democracy. Nevertheless, in the vigour of the criticism and in the resignations could be seen the embryo of the plural party system.

But it is not so easy to found a party in Turkey. In self-defence against conspiracy the revolutionary Government had passed a Law of Associations, which required police consent and supervision. The qualification for membership of the National Uplift party involved the abjuration of alcohol, gambling, loose living and corruption. The leader overlooked some formalities and was obliged to apply for permission to begin again and before long he was expelled by his own adherents. There were more than a dozen of such "parties", all more or less freakish, yet inspired by the highest ideals.

The Democrat party was led by Celal* Bayar, a keen supporter of Atatürk. As the general election was pending he set to work feverishly with his supporters, and organized with such success that in the elections of 1946 the Democrats appeared as a compact opposition with 66 seats in a house of 395 deputies.

Celal Bayar is a cautious statesman who refuses to be stampeded, but some of his supporters were dissatisfied, including the late Marshal Chakmak and Hikmet Bayur. These formed the National party, of which the Marshal, with his great prestige, was chairman. On his death, Bayur assumed the leadership. More violent in their opposition, they despise the Democrats for being half-hearted.

Startled, the Republican party side-tracked the unpopular Shükrü Saracioglu, and after two or three changes, appointed Semsettin Günaltay Prime Minister. He is a respected man, a professor of history and a statesman. He stole some of the Democrats' thunder, permitted religious instruction in primary schools and established a faculty of theology. What is more important, he passed a new electoral law, placing the operations in the hands of the judiciary. This met the Democrat allegations that the returns of 1946 had been falsified and Celal Bayar accepted the draft. Then they faced the elections with confidence. They expected a small majority and stated that they were prepared to accept the responsibility of office. Their enemies smiled and observers anticipated their victory in the towns, but not in the rural constituencies.

The Democrats swept the country. Out of 487 seats they secured 410. The National party secured one seat. As one of the minority papers put it, it was a revolution without arms. If the allegation is true that the returns of 1946 were falsified, as the Democrats insist, then the general elections of May 14, 1950 were the first really free elections ever held in the country. Neither the sultans, nor the Byzantine emperors, nor the Romans, nor the Hittites, or Cimmerians, or Neolithic man, had ever known such a thing.

For the first time in the history of Turkey there had been a change of power without violence and a free expression of the will of the

* The Turkish C is equivalent to our J, so phonetically, his name would be written Jelal.

people. The elections had been marked by very few incidents, even in country districts and the peaceful success was hailed by the Democrats as evidence of the maturity of the people, a clear disproof of the thesis of the Republicans, that it is premature to introduce democracy into Turkey.

What were the causes of this victory ? For one thing, the magic word 'democracy' had swept the country. *Demokrat* is an imported word, a western word, and its success to-day is confirmation of the repeated statement of aim of Turkish leaders, that their goal is complete democracy on the western model. Further, we can see in this victory the expression of the people's disapproval of the party which no longer responded to its aspirations. Some of the papers say that it is the manifestation of the craving of a people that have too long been bullied. The Republican party is accused of "absorbing into its maw all the fruits of its activities," of putting sand in the machinery by a cumbrous bureaucracy, preventing free criticism and snubbing the racial minorities. It had been too long in power and had lost contact with the people.

On May 22 a salute of 101 guns told the world that Celal Bayar had been elected President of the Republic by 387 votes out of 453. It was announced that he had invited Adnan Menderes to form a cabinet. Fuat Köprülü became Minister of Foreign Affairs and Refik Koraltan the Speaker and President of the National Assembly.

What do these new names mean ? Celal Bayar was born in Anatolia in 1884. Although educated in the country, he had imbibed modern ideas from his father, an immigrant from Bulgaria, and at the French School at Bursa. In every way he was very advanced for the period. When most Turks looked upon the government service as the only respectable career for a young man of good family, Celal took employment with the Deutsche Orient Bank, work in those days generally left to foreigners and minorities. He took part actively in all the revolutionary movements, always working for a reasoned nationalism, against the chauvinist and reactionary current that appeared within the Young Turkey party. He was a keen supporter of Atatürk and earned fame as he tramped the country disguised as a wandering teacher, under the name of Galib Hodja. During the revolutionary years and the invasion of Anatolia by the Greeks, he was energetically stirring up the national spirit and co-ordinating operations. Upon the victory, Atatürk thanked him and made him Minister of Reconstruction and Settlement of Refugees. The latter was no light task, at the time of interchange of population. He founded the Ish Bank, which owns businesses and has branches all over Turkey, and finally, he was Atatürk's last Prime Minister. He is a modest man, of pleasing personality, keen political insight and great organizing powers.

Adnan Menderes, his Prime Minister, has never played a prominent rôle. He resigned with his leader in 1945, but his name was little known to the public. He owns large estates in the valley of the Maeander, in Turkish Menderes, whence his surname, and being rich, has no axe to grind. He was educated at the American College in Izmir, where he drank in western views. It is strange to begin political life with the highest office. He is not included in the Turkish equivalent of *Who's Who*.

The new Minister of Foreign Affairs, Fuat Köprülü, is a distinguished intellectual. Born in 1890, he has devoted his life to teaching and research in history and literature and is author of many important works. He is Honorary Professor of the Universities of Athens, Heidelberg and Paris ; small wonder that he met with a very friendly reception on his first official visit to the French capital.

The other members of the cabinet are experts, official or professional. The Minister of Justice, Halil Ozyürük, was President of the Court of Appeal. His name was mentioned as a likely President of the Republic when it was hoped that Celal Bayar would become Prime Minister. The burden will fall chiefly upon the shoulders of the Minister of Finance, who has the unenviable job of clearing up the mess his party has inherited. He is Halil Ayan, who has served as Inspector of Finance to the Bank of Agriculture and of the Ministry. After spending a period of study in France, he reached the post of Under-Secretary of State for Finance. It is hoped he will reorganize the Central Bank.

First and foremost the new Government will carry on the same foreign policy as all its predecessors, based on friendship with Great Britain, France and the United States. It will meet all its obligations under the United Nations Charter. It is to be remembered that through the war, in spite of the collapse of France, Turkey remained unswerving in her alliance with ourselves and our cause.

The fundamental cause of the Democrat victory being economic, it is in this sphere that we shall find its clearest expression. The four principal points are a general economy in expenditure and balancing of the budget, reorganization of foreign trade, a thorough reform of the fiscal system, and de-nationalization of the great State-owned industries. It is this last item to which the Republicans object, as they assert that it is tampering with the fundamental Six Points of Atatürk. And an Amnesty Bill is being prepared, the press law will be overhauled or abolished, and the right to strike will be granted, subject to the usual safeguards.

The Government has issued warnings to the man in the street not to expect a miracle in a day. In his opening address, Adnan Menderes pointed out that the State would continue to reserve the industries of basic commodities and public service, clearly implying

that there would be no de-nationalization of coal and iron or communications. But the number of monopoly articles would be cut down heavily. The State industries administered by the great banks, such as numerous textile and paper mills, leather and boot factories, cement works, and so on, would be transferred to private capital as and when possible. There is little liquid capital in Turkey and practically no investing public. Encouragement will be given to foreign capital.

The reorganization of the fiscal service will be a long job ; the Customs code and taxation system will be completely reorganized, and real economies will be effected in the spending departments. The Government is up against the problems of reducing the cost of living and also taxation and balancing the budget. The deficits in the past have been covered by loans. Now it will be done by economies. The expenditure of the presidential office has been reduced by half a million *lire*, as Celal Bayar has suppressed the special presidential train and the yacht *Savarona*, the upkeep alone of which costs £T600,000 a year. He has reduced the fleet of presidential cars from eighteen to three. The presidential palaces are to be converted into museums. A new building for the National Assembly, which cost £T100,000,000, is to be used as a hospital. The price of State textiles has been cut by nine to ten per cent. ; the price of sugar has been cut by 30 per cent. and more, and five *kurush* has been cut off the price of the loaf by abolition of the turnover tax. The price of grain is to be maintained at its present level in the interest of the peasants. These four items alone cost 20 to 25 million *lire*, to be met by economies. These are tokens. Already after six weeks in office, the Government has effected a saving of 40 to 45 million. Four months of the inherited budget have run, but in spite of that they hope to bring economies up to the target of 200 million. Further, the Prime Minister has stated that public health and agriculture have been starved and that they will revise the judicial system and education. And the public, especially the commercial public, look eagerly to decentralization and the reduction of the cobweb of red tape.

To carry out these reforms the Government is appointing a Supreme Economic Council, of experts, officials and business men.

And what is the fate of the Republican People's party, which, after 27 years of unrestricted power, now finds itself in the wilderness ? There seems to be no doubt that the completeness of their defeat has staggered the Republicans, who realized they were running a risk, but never envisaged such a landslide. And so now they are calling for scapegoats.

The Republicans can expect no mercy. One of the surprising things about the new party is its hatred. In his first address to the Assembly Adnan Menderes threw the blame of the present state of

affairs upon the Republicans without mincing his words. He used such expressions as "sweepings", "fraud", "swindling", and cried that they had battered upon favouritism; a few weeks previously such expressions would have meant prison for the speaker. And the Government are not hesitating in ventilating old scandals, though there are those who regret this washing of dirty linen in public, and some of the linen is dirty indeed. As another Minister put it, speaking of abuse of opportunity: "Men more clever than scrupulous have taken advantage of the movement of funds and big expropriations under the name of loans." These will all be investigated. The day of reckoning has come. Unless the Republican party can change its mentality and form a genuine opposition, it will disintegrate. That means a return to single party government, with all its dangers.

Will the Democrats succeed in their ambitious programme? Many are sceptical. One thing is certain: it will take them a long time. Four years is a short time for the reorganization of the State. But they are full of confidence and have begun well, and they have the support of all the well-meaning men in the country.

To conclude with an anecdote. A wise old peasant is reported to have said to Celal Bayar: "We have put you in power. Now we will see how you can use it. You have four years in which to show us. If we do not approve then, well, it is easy to uproot a young tree."

(Dr. Malcolm Burr writes from Istanbul where he lives.)

FRENCH WEST AFRICA

BY KENNETH ROBINSON

PERHAPS the most compelling reason why we should want to know anything of French West Africa is that in this part of the world the eventual destiny of territories for which we in Britain are still ultimately responsible, is inextricably mixed up with the French territory in which the British colonies of the Gambia, Sierra Leone, the Gold Coast and Nigeria are only successively larger enclaves, like a series of increasingly bigger bites from a slice of bread. Yet even Nigeria, the largest of all our colonial territories is only about one fifth the size of French West Africa, though by itself it carries more than half as many people again as the whole of the French territories. It is with the western-educated minority that the future so largely rests. It rests with them and us, the British and the French, whether these countries and their people are to take their place in the free world or go down in anarchy and tyranny. But Britain and France are still uneasy bed-fellows in the colonial world and those on either side of the frontier who, conscious of these imperatives, cry for a "common policy" are crying for the moon. The dangers of this situation are real though not yet explicit.

French West Africa is a group of eight territories, Senegal, Sudan, Guinea, Niger, Ivory Coast, Upper Volta, Dahomey and Mauretania, each of which has its own governor, its own local budget, and its own local representative assembly but all of which are parts of what is sometimes rather loosely described as the Federation of French West Africa, under a Governor General, with his headquarters at Dakar. Taken as a whole, it is a poor country. The total revenue raised by taxation in 1949 was about £21 millions, or about 27 shillings per head, of which more than three quarters came from indirect taxes, mostly customs taxes. In 1948, the total value of external trade was of the order of £70 millions, or a little over £4 per head of the population. Of course, these averages for "French West Africa" conceal many regional variations. Not much short of half the total revenue, for instance, came from the Senegal while another fifth came from the Ivory Coast, the rest being divided among the remaining six territories. Just to put these figures in perspective, the little British enclave of the Gold Coast has, by itself, a population about one quarter that of all French West Africa, while its revenue

from taxation in 1949 was about £16 million or £4 per head and its external trade in 1948 about £61 million, or £15 per head. Figures of this kind are sometimes alleged to show the superiority of one kind of colonial rule over another. I believe any such inference to be quite illegitimate and my purpose in citing them is only to underline the poverty of the area as a whole, even in comparison with other African territories. Any attempt to assess the French effort must keep in mind this poverty, and also the fact that it implies, in large parts of the area as a whole, a relatively slight penetration of the western monetary economy and all the social conflict and disintegration of the older ways of life which that almost inevitably brings. It is no accident that it is the areas of greatest wealth, Senegal and the Ivory Coast, which are the scene of most political activity.

The administrative structure of French West Africa is relatively simple. The supreme authority is the Governor General, or as he is more commonly called nowadays, High Commissioner. Essentially his powers stem naturally from the definition of his position in the decree of 1904, which remains the basic document: "*personnalité morale interposée entre les Colonies associées et le gouvernement de la République.*" As such he exercises locally the powers of the Republic and he possesses the sole right to correspond directly with the metropolitan government. These are the twin pillars of his position and, in spite of periodical demands for more decentralization from Dakar to the individual territories, his powers have certainly not diminished with the passage of years. The governors of the individual territories thus occupy positions more akin to those of the chief commissioners in Nigeria or the Gold Coast than to that of our own governors. Each territory in turn is divided into *cercles* (there are 102 in French West Africa), and each *cercle* includes one or more sub-divisions. At the head of each *cercle* is the *commandant de cercle* and, under him, the *chefs de subdivision*. It is difficult to relate these units directly to the administrative units of our own territories if only because of the variation in both, but generally the *cercle* corresponds to our district rather than to a province.

In principle, each *cercle* has its *Conseil de Notables*, but these bodies do not seem to play any very vital part in local affairs. Generally speaking, chiefs, in the British sense of persons exercising customary authority in indigenous society who are recognized by the colonial administration for local administrative and judicial purposes, do not exist in French West Africa, though there are, of course, exceptions, especially in the more northern territories. Each *subdivision* is, however, divided into *cantons* each of which has its *chef de canton* under whom in turn are the village headmen. While efforts are usually made to secure for these posts persons who command local support and sometimes indeed they are held by men

who enjoy customary authority, their position is rather that of subordinate civil servants in the administrative hierarchy than that of the recognized traditional leaders of customary society as in British territories. Too much can perhaps be made of this distinction and now that there is more widespread acknowledgment of the difficulties of indirect rule on the classical pattern in areas where indigenous society has not evolved for itself political systems with a relatively high degree of centralized power, people are more ready to admit that in many areas at least in French West Africa the failure to introduce 'indirect rule' may not have been so entirely a case of original sin as used to be suggested. Much more important is the fact that the French system involves the employment of persons who, however acceptable they may be to the people, are essentially local agents of the central administration, rather than the development of largely autonomous local authorities, whether these latter are wholly traditional, wholly artificial, or as they increasingly are in British Africa, a mixture of both. At a time when one of the basic aims of British policy is the development of local government as a form, one might almost say, of mass education in citizenship, the absence throughout the rural areas of French West Africa of any similar activity is one of the major differences in policy.

In the larger towns, nevertheless, there are several forms of municipality. In some places communes were established in the last century and have now practically the same powers as similar communes at home. They have wholly elected councils which in turn elect the *maire*, and they carry out a fair range of local government activities. Elsewhere, there are '*communes de moyen exercice*' with a wholly elected council but an official nominated as *maire*, or *communes mixtes* with partly or wholly nominated councils and an official nominated as *maire*. These are not dissimilar from our own variations on the municipal theme though the general scope of their activities is rather more limited. Few, for example, run a library and none a municipal bus service. The entire revenue of the *commune* of Abidjan about equals the profit on the bus service in Accra.

There is throughout the rural areas a great need for small works of betterment, many of which are most effectively provided by a combination of central encouragement and local consent, if not local initiative. It is essentially as an instrument for securing such consent and eliciting such initiative that local authorities, whether traditional or not, have been used by our administrative officers and their efforts have been powerfully assisted by the native authority budgets since these have often provided the financial means required with a minimum of central interference and supervision. It is not surprising to find therefore that from the same practical necessities, an institution having recognizably similar though not identical social

functions has been evolved in French Africa. This is the *Société de Prévoyance*, an administrative device as characteristic, in its way, of French colonies as native authorities of our own. In principle every *cercle* has its provident society, of which all taxpayers who are cultivators must be members. The subscription is collected at the same time as the head tax, and there is a board of management of which the *Commandant de cercle* is president, which discusses the annual budget. The original function of the society was to lend seed to its members and to recover its loan, together with interest, in kind at harvest time. But with its funds and loans which it can raise it undertakes all manner of minor works of betterment, the purchase and sale of simple agricultural implements, the construction of wells, dams, cattle dips, the provision of lorry transport, decorticating or oil-pressing machinery, and so forth. These societies are in many ways the instrument by which a good administrator seeks to help his people. Like our native administrations they show great variations in size and range of activity, from the old-established societies in Senegal, rich from their groundnut sales, to rather sketchy organizations in more backward areas where cash crops are practically non-existent.

Nowadays, the provident societies are under sentence of death. They are attacked—much like our native administrations—as mere creatures of the administration, with no proper democratic control, used for purposes which should be the responsibility of the central government ; their replacement by true co-operatives on the one hand and by other governmental agencies on the other is now envisaged. But it seems unlikely that they will in fact be superseded in many areas for some years to come. One of the new instruments, intended to replace the use of provident society funds for minor public works is the *Fonds de Génie Rural*, the idea of which is that any group of people can put up a project for such works to which they are prepared to contribute, either in cash or in kind, one-third of the cost. The government services will help them in preparing the project and if it is approved, the remaining two-thirds of the cost will be found equally by the territory and the federation as a whole. It is too soon to say how this will work but it seems to involve a great deal of central supervision and control, which must lessen its usefulness since “seizing the moment” is so often the key to such local initiative.

Each territory has its own budget but all indirect taxes are paid to the Government General and the main source of territorial revenue is the poll tax or *minimum fiscal* as it is now called. Income taxes are relatively unimportant—incomes less than £500 are exempt—and the yield of the poll tax is small, amounting to rather less than one-fifth of the total raised by taxation. The amount of the poll tax

varies from area to area but nowhere exceeds about 12s. 6d. Experiments are being made with a kind of graduated poll tax by which much higher rates will be charged to particular categories—traders, teachers, civil servants and so on—but at present the yield is low and all territories are dependent on the rebates and subventions they receive from the general budget.

Since 1946 each territory has its "local representative assembly" which British travellers are apt to compare with the legislative councils of our territories and then to conclude that they are bogus, an attempt to combine a façade of democracy with the substance of metropolitan control. In fact these bodies are modelled closely on the *conseil général* of a department of metropolitan France, and the degree to which they are subject to executive control is almost exactly the same. They do not, of course, as British legislative councils do, make laws for the territory: that is the function of the metropolitan legislature, in which all parts of French West Africa are represented, or of the executive. They vote the budget—though much expenditure, for example that authorized by statute, is obligatory—and they must allocate the necessary revenue to meet it. They settle such matters as public works and the organization of savings banks and co-operatives; they are consulted about the grant of concessions, mining permits, scholarships; and they may of course pass resolutions addressed to the Ministry of Overseas France on matters of general interest. The number of members varies from territory to territory: from 50 in Senegal to 24 in Mauretania. In all except Senegal they are elected by two separate electorates, one composed of the citizens of *statut français*, that is to say, Frenchmen of metropolitan origin, and the small proportion of Africans who have accepted French private law in place of their customary law; and one composed of all citizens of *statut local* who are entitled to vote, that is, those Africans who still remain subject to their own customary private law.

In principle, this second electorate should amount to universal suffrage, and that is indeed the declared aim. But in fact at present it consists only of those citizens of *statut local* whose identity can be established. Registration of births, deaths and marriages is no more widespread in French territories than in ours, so this involves prescribing a variety of qualifications for the franchise such as employment in the public service, military service, possession of various educational certificates and even of driving and shooting licences. The existence of these two separate electorates is hotly attacked on democratic grounds. It is, in fact, the French variant of our communal roll, and apart from that, the first electorate usually elects many more members in proportion to their numbers than the second. In no case, however, do they command a majority in the

assembly, in which moreover there are no nominated or official members. The demand for a common roll—the *collège unique* which already exists in Senegal—is frequently heard among politicians.

The financial and political arrangements of the territory are substantially repeated at the "federal" level. At Dakar, there is a *Grand Conseil* for French West Africa as a whole, composed of 40 members, five for each territory, elected by the members of the territorial assembly. Its powers are, broadly speaking, the same in relation to the group as a whole as those of each territorial assembly in relation to the affairs of the territory. In particular, it settles the general budget, subject to meeting the obligatory expenditure.

Before the war, French West Africa was the classical home of that policy, or more correctly, admixture of policies which the theorists of the Third Republic called *association*. In West Africa the traditional policy of assimilation was clearly inapplicable, at any rate, instantaneously, and the practical way out seemed to be the attempt to create an *élite* associated with the French in the development of the country. The *élite* itself was, in principle, to be assimilated and, to the extent that it achieved cultural assimilation, accepted as French. But, in practice, it largely gave place to a sort of n.c.o. class, of Africans trained to be auxiliaries in the various government services, medical and veterinary assistants, teachers, clerks, and the like, most of whom had been trained locally to meet local needs and whose diplomas were unrecognized in the metropolitan educational and professional system. Citizenship—except for those born in the old communes of Senegal—was restricted to those who besides achieving a certain level of education were prepared to accept French private law, which of course involved matrimonial law. All this, and much more of a similar kind by which the rigid uniformities of assimilationist doctrine had been tempered to the realities of a part of Africa much of which was but slightly touched by western influences, was, at the end of the war, fiercely attacked by Frenchmen of all parties (except the extreme right, which was then hardly vocal), no less than by African political leaders, as "colonialism".

This upsurge of feeling, partly provoked by the current sentiment against 'imperialism' in the world, partly encouraged by the wartime experience of 'Fighting France', and partly the natural accompaniment of any leftward turn in France itself, resulted in a whole series of reforms, all tending in an assimilationist direction, which French West Africa is only just beginning to digest. Citizenship was extended to all, without the requirement of accepting French private law, though as we have seen, this did not immediately involve universal suffrage. Forced labour in all its forms was abolished and for a time the economy, suffering anyway from an absolute shortage of all consumer goods, was virtually paralysed. The *indigénat*, the

special legal régime which had applied before the war to all Africans who were not citizens, and under which they had been subject to the summary jurisdiction of administrative officers in respect of offences created by the administration, was abolished and all criminal jurisdiction removed to the French criminal courts. This last reform is gradually being implemented as more and more professional magistrates are appointed.

But although there is a certain feeling of "settling down" after what some regard as the rather doctrinaire decisions of 1946, the tide is still set against all that savours of 'colonialism', particularly the forms of colonialism. This results in a policy which is predominantly assimilationist, a policy which plays a similar part in the dynamics of change in the French territories as the recent emphasis on an ever more rapid progress towards self-government in British West Africa. This renewed assimilationist philosophy is most of all in evidence in the recasting of the educational system to ensure absolute equivalence between the schools and colleges of French West Africa and those of France itself. Unfortunately this equivalence seems too often to be equated with identity and many promising experiments in adapting the educational system to the needs of West Africa have perished in the process.

Although our institutions are so different and our colonial policies reflect the differences, neither we nor the French can ignore the underlying similarity of the problem. In the long run it seems unlikely that French West Africa will escape the growing pains of nationalism. The assimilationist tendency (as inevitable for the French as our preoccupation with self government on a parliamentary model is for us) and the very considerable drive for economic development now in progress in French West Africa, are bound to increase and intensify the points of contact between traditional African and western social patterns and to do so at a speed which must diminish the likelihood of a smooth and gradual evolution of a new society. It is vital that we should all, British and French, understand that such difficulties are largely the inevitable consequence of the speed at which the world is shrinking rather than the result of what each still tends to consider the misguided policy of the other.

(The author, who has recently returned from French West Africa, is a Fellow of Nuffield College and Reader in Colonial Administration at Oxford.)

DANGER-POINT IN JAPAN

BY MARC T. GREENE

BEFORE the war it was considered by most informed persons that the limit of Japan's resources in food-production had been, or was at the point of being, reached. Under the pressure of expansion of trade and increase of population that production had been increased nearly 100 per cent. between 1880 and 1940. Rice and wheat accounted for most of this gain.

As the least observant visitor could not fail to note, every available square foot of soil was used for cereal and vegetable growing, chiefly of course, rice. As you passed through the Inland Sea you saw hilly islands completely covered with rice paddies and mountain slopes steep as the roof of a house planted half-way to the summits. Along the railway lines you discovered rice often growing to the very edges of the tracks and among the closely-placed houses of suburban areas plots no more than a dozen feet square.

Between 1880 and 1920 Japan's cultivated areas had expanded from 12 to 16 per cent. of the total land area, resulting in a cultivation of about 15,000,000 acres. This was reduced half a million acres by war requisitions between 1941 and 1945. Under the Occupation that has been recovered, but the geological character of Japan and the low fertility of the soil, requiring intensive fertilization, sets about 19 per cent., or 17,000,000 acres, as the outside limit of the agricultural potential. Sixty-eight per cent. of the total land is afforested country, the remainder being lakes and rivers, mountain wasteland above the timber-line, roads and inhabited areas.

Most of the nitrogenic and phosphatic commercial fertilizer used in Japan before the war was domestically produced, but inorganic potash was imported. The war seriously crippled, indeed all but destroyed, both sources of supply. In the three years following the end of the war the Occupation restored this to the extent of an increase of more than 300 per cent. in the case of nitrogenous fertilizer, from negligible to over a million metric tons in phosphatic, and in the potash supply from zero to 160,000 metric tons. All this fertilizer is supplied to farmers on a systematic allocation basis. In addition, the unrestricted use of compost and "night-soil" is well above the pre-war average.

Apart from these, the Occupation, through its natural resources

section, has taught Japanese farmers improved insect and disease control of a menace which before the war reduced their crops by more than 12 per cent. annually. It has also furnished better seeds and instructed in improved methods of plant breeding, inspection and distribution. Among the most important of its aids to Japanese agricultural economy are seed farms for the production of white potatoes. The years 1948-1949, despite unseasonably bad weather, saw the largest white-potato production in the country's history. Sweet-potatoes, one of the most important Japanese staples next to rice, used to be lost in great quantities through bad curing and storage. Correcting this has been to the great advantage of the producers and of the population generally.

The present population of Japan is more than 80,000,000, nearly half of whom over the age of 14 are labourers, including 18,000,000 farmers and foresters. Fisheries, all-important in Japan, occupy 600,000; mining, smelting and the refining of metals half a million. Children, part-time and seasonal workers in agriculture would greatly augment these figures. In the United States all these occupations include only about one-third of the population.

The United States of America are committed to the responsibility of not only seeing that the Japanese people do not starve but that they no longer suffer the want and wretchedness that had begun to creep upon them just before the war and that all but submerged them at its end. This responsibility entails making up the deficit between Japanese production and minimum need, and such instruction, guidance and aid in the improvement of Japanese economy, especially agricultural, as shall provide that economy with a stable and enduring basis after the American occupation. To these ends the natural resources section assumes a responsibility that involves 90 per cent. of Japan's total land area, 53 per cent. of the adult working population, and 95 per cent. of all the funds allotted for Japanese relief.

This last points out the high importance of the maximum development of Japanese natural resources if the Occupation is to accomplish anything significant, and to justify the large past, present and future expenditure of the American tax-payer's money. For it is obvious that we cannot let the Japanese people starve—which at the war's end hundreds of thousands seemed likely to do and a good many actually did—not only on grounds of humanitarianism, but also on grounds of political expediency.

Before the war the Japanese farmer lived and toiled in a state of economic hopelessness and psychological misery which made him easy prey for the military and imperialistic propagandist and sympathetic to any expansionist policy that held out hope of a betterment of his wretched condition. He was always worse off than the rest of the population, since the national policies designed to expand

industrial production and foreign trade—and which accomplished this with a good deal of success in the decade previous to the war—relegated him to an inferior position in the national economy.

And yet the foundation of the economy of an agricultural country like Japan, in which nearly 50 per cent. of the people are farmers, is obviously its peasantry. As the supreme commander has pointed out, this is the largest proportion in the world of any important country. In the physical field then, the first consideration of the Occupation continues to be the rehabilitation and the stabilization of the agricultural economy.

The Japanese Government itself was, of course, alive to this consideration long before the war, yet the best it could do in the matter of land reclamation and improvement as a basic means of increasing food production was less than 30,000 acres annually, a gain mostly offset in the immediate pre-war period by diversions of agricultural land to other uses, largely military. Cultivated areas thus decreased, as we have already seen by more than 500,000 acres.

But under SCAP General MacArthur's ideas and plans, aided by expert civilian advice, were written into the famous Land Reform Law, sometimes called the supreme commander's "pet" scheme. It gave the new Japanese Government authority to acquire uncultivated land for reclamation and it set up arrangements for sale to farmers. In this way the Government, in the course of four years, acquired 2,700,000 acres, more than a third of which has already been reclaimed and cultivated. In all this work SCAP experts have aided Japanese authorities and farmers in every way.

Under the present system, rice and other staple crops are subject to quotas. Before planting time delivery quotas are assigned the several prefectures on the basis of "normal" production. The prefectures sub-allot quotas to counties and cities which in turn make allotments to towns and villages. These make the assignments to individual farmers. Quotas may later be revised downward if untoward crop conditions seem so to require. On the other hand, production over the allotment, in the case of the individual farmer, may be purchased at twice, or in some cases three times, the regular quota price, or, if he prefers, the farmer may retain the surplus for himself. Consumer goods in short supply are made available to farmers on a priority basis as an incentive to crop deliveries. Out of all these things deliveries from 1946 to the present have shown a steady increase.

Before the war more than two-thirds of Japanese farmers were in the grip of the iniquitous landlord system which added constant apprehension to their other trials and miseries. It was entirely feudalistic and demanded the payment of exorbitant rents in kind sometimes amounting to 70 per cent. of the crop yield. This was

exactly the same position as in China, a position from which in large measure stems the chaos in that country to-day.

The Land Reform Plan involved the purchase by the Government from the landlords for sale to the individual farmers. There was nothing that could be called confiscation. The landlords, whatever or however bad the record of their former dealings with their tenants, received fair prices for their property.

The first transfer phase, now completed, involved 30 million tracts of cultivatable land, more than 4,500,000 acres. Sale to the cultivators is made on as easy and reasonable terms as possible. For the remaining 12 per cent. certain cultivated land which remains in tenancy to provide, as the explanation goes, "the necessary amount of tenure flexibility," there are provisions to safeguard against any of the former landlord abuses.

Yet none of these things, admirable as they undoubtedly are and indicative of a full assumption of responsibility on America's part, can alter the general Japanese food position, which, as always, is a deficit position. Agricultural production on land that would be described as "sub-marginal" in the United States must be maintained and one of the measures required for this is compulsory crop insurance, at least partly supported by Government subsidy, and also voluntary livestock insurance. The Natural Resources Section supervised the establishment of insurance schemes by the Japanese Ministry of Agriculture.

The Japanese through many years have not only utilized to the limit of natural resource their land-potential, but the possibilities of the seas that surround them. To-day more than a million people in full or part time are in the fisheries industry. Practically every species of sea creature, and even sea plant, known to these waters is used, either for human consumption or for some industrial purpose. In all this endeavour the fishermen of Japan had, before the war, covered a greater area of the high seas than any others in recorded history. In pre-war years their average catch was not far from ten U.S. billion pounds, more than double the production of the United States, the second fish-producing nation. Four-fifths of the Japanese catch came from sea areas still authorized for fishing, the remainder mostly from northern waters now under Soviet jurisdiction. But 85 per cent. of all Japanese marine production came from waters hardly out of sight of the coast.

The war, of course, played havoc with Japanese fisheries, whose rehabilitation had to commence from a much lower level than agriculture's. Nevertheless, the industry has been restored practically to the pre-war figure, except for herring, which constituted nearly a third of the entire catch and which shows a marked decline, just as on

the Pacific coast of America. For reasons in each case undiscoverable.

The Japanese fishing fleet, however, has been restored to its pre-war level and more. This is a considerable accomplishment, especially in view of the fact that the scarcity of fishing supplies due to the war was very serious. To meet this an emergency allotment of \$15,000,000 was made by the Occupation in 1947, and additional funds totalling three times as much were provided during the following year. With this aid sea production in 1949 totalled more than 7,000,000,000 pounds which, leaving aside the aforesaid herring, is well over pre-war.

The forestry situation in Japan is perhaps the most serious of all, directly due to wartime over-cutting when the drain was four times the amount of growth. Japan's trees cover 68 per cent. of the total land area. They have always been a vital asset to the Japanese people whose *per capita* consumption of wood, both as fuel and timber, is one of the largest in the world. And because of the extremely mountainous terrain, which requires forest cover as watershed protection, the forests have an important influence on food and power production, regulating water-supply, controlling floods, and preventing erosion and the silting-up of reservoirs and farm lands.

Nevertheless, Japan's wood requirements have been such that much importation has been the rule. This was halted when the demands of the militarists expended the country's export credits on specific war materials; the result was the over-cutting. So great have been the demands since the war in reconstruction that present over-cutting is even now more than twice the growth rate. This means virtual forest exhaustion within an easily discernible period, in spite of which plans now in hand call for increased cutting during the next five years. Here is one of the serious problems of the future, especially as no formula has yet been discovered for the correction of bad and wasteful forestry practices in the past. Yet all that can be done is being done. The National Resources Section is furnishing the Japanese Government agencies with the most expert advice available on silviculture, reforestation, wood preservation, opening up of supposedly inaccessible forests, use of wood substitutes (special emphasis on this), improved timber utilization processes, increased timber importation, and embargoes on raw timber exports.

Experts are of opinion that, as the situation already shows signs of improvement through guidance, advice and material aid, complete forest rehabilitation is not without the bounds of possibility. This would mean that there would be sufficient forests to meet the fuel and timber needs of an even larger population, as well as a surplus for export.

The most serious problem of all, of course, and the danger-point

now and as far as anyone can see in the future, is the problem of food. Japan has always been short of food and the war greatly emphasized this condition. Through the preceding 20 years, with the most intensive use of all soil resources, food imports, mainly rice, were kept down to an average of 3,000,000 tons a year. But, what with the elimination of Manchuria, Korea and Formosa as sources of supply and the resettlement of millions of Japanese, the shortage will long be grave for Occupation and the Japanese Government alike.

At the war's end Japanese food supplies had fallen so low as to support a basic ration of only 1,066 calories each a day for the city consumers, and through the spring and early summer of 1946 this went even lower. Then large-scale imports advanced it to 1,300 by the beginning of 1947 and to 1,440 by another year. Supplementary rations for heavy labour reached a peak of 3,600 calories for coal miners. This was achieved, in the face of threats of widespread disease and violence unless the desperate position was not alleviated, by measures which increased the rice production from 19,000,000 *koku* (a *koku* is 4.95 bushels) in 1945, to a third more the next year, and to 31,000,000 in 1948-1949 ; this as against 36,000,000 in the war years. In addition, food imports were greatly expanded and in 1946 811,000 metric tons of essential foodstuffs were brought in from the United States ; 2,012,000 in 1947 (most of which was supplied through United States appropriations), and 2,190,000 tons in 1948, practically all of which was purchased with American funds. In 1949 the procuring of foodstuffs with the proceeds of exports was resumed for the first time.

It is probable that never before has a great nation, having conquered another first rank power in war, accepted the responsibility not only of preserving that nation as a going concern but of bringing it back to a point of at least relative prosperity. It is even more certain that very few Americans have the least comprehension of the magnitude of that task, or of the length of time it is likely to require to complete it.

Yet it would be taking too much credit to ourselves to attribute our assumption of responsibility altogether to altruism, to humanitarian motives, to the mercy naturally to be expected of the victor. That is not to say that such motives do not enter into the undertaking. They do, and to a large degree especially in the purposes and sentiments of the supreme commander himself, who is beyond any doubt as humanitarian a military leader as history records.

On the other hand, to permit the Japanese to fall back into the slough of hunger and wretchedness that was their immediate post-war condition would be to open the doors wide to Communism. So that, instead of constituting the " new " Japan as an Asiatic bastion against

the Russian advance to the Pacific, we might, in effect, turn over to Moscow a strong and vital Pacific outpost.

It is not without significance that whereas in the House of Representatives of 1947 there were but four communists, in the latest (1949) there are 35. But that, in the view of a pre-war Japanese leader like Yokachiro Suma, former Ambassador to Spain, with whom this correspondent talked, is far from declaring the strength of the communist underground. "It is our greatest danger," he said, "and far more powerful already than anyone in or out of Japan realizes." So, in repeating the truism that the seeds of Communism sprout soonest and richest in a social soil that is impaired by want and uncertainty, the necessity of fructifying this soil becomes manifest. Communism got its real start in Japan in the post-war era of misery and restiveness. It can be checked, probably in time eliminated, by destroying the causes of that misery and restiveness.

This is the high objective of the MacArthur policy. The progress is real and significant, but that is not necessarily to say it is sufficient or that it will achieve the purpose, either tomorrow or in the more distant future. Therein is the danger-point, whether or not the Russian advance to the Pacific—commenced in the days of the Romanoffs and having exactly the same objectives in our day—can be stemmed, short of war, before it gains a foothold in Japan as it has done in China, strongly threatens to do in Indo-China, and may do elsewhere in East Asia. If we cannot put Japan on her feet as a self-supporting—and self-respecting nation—within a short time, it is certain that her people will turn their faces elsewhere. For that reason, what we are doing in Japan, have done and will continue to do, is necessary in our own interest and that of democracy generally, and it must be done whatever the cost.

How far the endeavour to indoctrinate the Japanese people with the concepts of free government and against the precepts of totalitarianism has been successful is a question. There are many opinions. The consensus of objective view appears to be that ideology must wait upon physical rehabilitation. If that is so, all that we have done to this end and have still to do is wholly justified, even if on no other grounds. It is certain that the Japanese people have made great progress in five years, both physically and in strengthened morale. It is equally certain that they have a lively comprehension of how much of that they owe to America and to the MacArthur policy.

You may perhaps suggest that comprehension and appreciation are not necessarily concomitant in this case. That is of course true. It is possible that the extreme deference the average Japanese shows to-day to every American, the obvious efforts he is always making to curry favour, are more expediency than sincerity. That, too, may be the fact. It is also possible, though exceedingly improbable, that

the attitude and feeling toward the supreme commander—which stops little short of reverence—is no more than the traditional ingrained Japanese reverence for high authority and—more—for the symbol of conquering power. There are bound to be different opinions about these things. To this writer, having seen a good deal of the country and talked with many Japanese of all classes lately, it seems that there is a real regard and respect for the Americans and that it is founded not so much on subservience to power as on appreciation of kindly and generous treatment, as opposed to the dreadful things Japanese leaders told their people would happen when, and if, they ever came under American dominance.

Instead of having everything taken from them they have been given vast stores of life's necessities and have seen themselves the object of large expenditure. With the exception of a handful of war criminals, even active participants in the struggle against the West have been restored to their former places. As one example, the editor of the *Japan Economist* who wrote, in 1939, that Japan must fight both America and Britain, served for some time as Finance Minister in one of the post-war Cabinets. Instead of their women being maltreated the Japanese have seen these accorded equal political suffrage, and every other barrier to their complete cultural parity with men removed. And instead of being reduced to industrial impotence and forced to the status of a third-rate, mainly agricultural, nation Japan has been encouraged and very materially aided to regain her former industrial status and even to improve upon it. This is indicated by the industrial trade pacts recently completed—with American advice and approval—with most of the other Asiatic countries.

We have done all this, and we shall do more. All we seek in return is response and receptivity to our endeavour to pass on our Western democratic ideology, a lively partnership in our attempt to keep the whole western Pacific and East Asian area from going over to the cold-war enemy. Will such response and receptivity be accorded us ?

(The author, an American, has just returned to Europe from Japan where he was accredited as a special correspondent to both the military and civilian branches of the Occupation Authority.)

THE COMMONWEALTH OF NATIONS

BY EDWIN HAWARD

“TWO only golden and glorious pillars that do uphold a throne, religion and justice, without which, as the mutability of fortune show, no Commonwealth can long endure.” Those sentiments, as Professor J. E. Neale has just recalled, came in the elaborate speech in which, by custom, that eminent lawyer, Serjeant Christopher Yelverton, presented himself to Queen Elizabeth for Her Majesty’s confirmation of his election as Speaker of the House of Commons in 1597. Four years later, John Croke, in the same position, spoke of the “prosperous estate and peace of this land, which had been defended by the mighty arm of our dread and sacred Queen”—to be interrupted by his august auditor: “No! but by the mighty hand of God, Mr. Speaker.”

It is fit to go back to the Elizabethan era, in which the origins of British adventure over the seven seas are to be found, for inspiration, if not guidance, in considering the future of the Commonwealth of Nations, the modern style of the British Empire. The explorers, merchant venturers and—in later centuries—missionaries who, with soldiers and sailors, helped to lay the foundations of this Commonwealth were ever under vigilant control by their people at home. Elizabeth, in her handling of the sea-captains who sailed the seas and brought back wealth to the national exchequer, set an example which was closely followed, with all the latest modern improvements, by governments after her time till the present day.

Standards of international conduct changed with the passing years. Lessons were learnt by the process of trial and error—the loss of the American colonies in the second half of the eighteenth century, the Durham Report on Canada, the shock of the South African War at the end of the Victorian era and Campbell-Bannerman’s caution: “Good government is no substitute for self-government”, Eire and Burma emerging as Republics without and India as a Republic within the Commonwealth. They were not learnt in vain as was shown by the solidarity of that Commonwealth in both world wars, but neither did they breed complacency.

This frequent taking of stock has been useful. Its dangers have perhaps lain in the inability of all but a few of the stay-at-home population to maintain an informed interest in its responsibilities

overseas. Shakespeare, with the topicality of the playwright, could casually mention the voyage of the *Tiger* which took to the Levant Ralph Fitch of the City of London on his historic journey to India and beyond, but when he thought of England, in terms of patriotism, she was "the precious stone set in the silver sea." Strong support came from the House of Commons and from the public opinion of the day for due control of the operations of the East India Company. It would have been unavailing had it been entirely dependent on reforming zeal and had not been able to count on the prejudices of political cliques or the jealousy aroused among the upper classes by the ostentatious luxury of the "nabobs".

So, in the present day, when knowledge of the Commonwealth is more readily to be acquired than ever before, the pressure of a multitude of new claimants for daily attention of the citizen, either in his or her newspaper or over the air prevents that knowledge from being as widely disseminated as it should be. Fortunately the expedition of air-travel exploited by official and semi-official delegations of all kinds mitigates this defect in that it gives Members of both Houses of Parliament and officials in Whitehall opportunities of which full advantage is taken. Indeed it may be fairly said that the modern House of Commons has among its members so many with personal knowledge of the Commonwealth that it may for once feel little inferiority to "the other place". "Pagett MP" is not quite dead but very nearly.

Where parliamentary discussions of Commonwealth problems may get out of focus is in the tendency on one side to believe that all recent changes in the constitutional, economic and political affairs of the Commonwealth derive exclusively from the party now in office and on the other in rightly resenting this over-simplification, to bemoan the disappearance of what might be called the ritual of paternalism. In fact, the contention that Commonwealth policy is outside party politics is justifiable; though, within the parties, the "little Englanders" as they used to be called, and the "Imperialists" (another outmoded term) both perform useful functions in their different ways. They discourage complacency and disregard of realities.

Since Elizabeth's time standards may have changed—looking round the world at the moment it seems arrogant to claim that all the changes have been for the better—but Yelverton's prescription for Commonwealth longevity, was recognized by Munroe, Raffles, Maitland and Henry Lawrence of the nineteenth century as by L. S. Amery and Mr. Attlee of to-day. Where reformers may find sympathy with the Elizabethans is in the discovery that the modern Treasury is little less rigid and unimaginative in its outlook on Commonwealth relations than the famous Lord High Treasurer

whose nod could not always have had the exuberance of meaning attributed to it by Sheridan.

The development of colonial policies could not take place *in vacuo*. The French Revolution, the Independence of the United States of America, the rise and fall after the 1914-1918 war of the League of Nations and its resurgence now as the United Nations, the defeat of Czarist Russia by the Japanese, all reflected currents of world opinion ahead of which it was not always possible for even the most progressively minded government to move.

It is true that Great Britain's declaration of August 1917, the harbinger of parliamentary self-government in India, was made eight months before President Woodrow Wilson's Fourteen Points paved the way for the League of Nations. It is also true that the League based the principles of its mandate system for what are now called the non-selfgoverning territories on the then established British policy for the colonial dependencies of the Empire. It is again true that, in the years immediately preceding the transfer of power in the Indian sub-continent, there was between the two contending parties—the British paramount authority and the Indian political leader—no difference of opinion except that the latter required an immediacy which the former regarded as beyond the bounds of prudence and—in wartime—physically impracticable.

Mr. Amery's declaration of August 1940, on behalf of the Coalition Government, that after the war India's constitution should be one framed by Indians in India and accepted by His Majesty's Government so long as it was not repudiated by "large or powerful elements in Indian national life" was in effect a pledge which Mr. Attlee's announcement of February 1947 setting a time limit to British control—a limit shortened within six months—ratified. In Mr. Attlee's words that was a fulfilment of policy, but, especially in the light of the tragic events which soon clouded celebration of independence, it should be admitted that the transfer to which that policy worked until the last moment, as it were, was of an undivided India, thwarted by the communal bugbear, despite the efforts of the Cabinet Mission and the then Viceroy Lord Wavell in 1946.

That momentous abdication in the Indian sub-continent with a population of 400 millions was bound to quicken pulses in other territories, even though they could not claim the same degree of experience in statecraft, administration and government. The nationalism designed to promote self-respect became violently xenophobic, just when its mentors in the west thought they were learning a better and broader internationalism, which in fact suddenly was torn asunder by rival conceptions of totalitarianism—Fascism and Communism with their confusing differences of facet.

The 1914-1918 war brought to an end a security and rule of law

which had covered far larger an area of the globe than either in the halting time till the 1939-1945 war began or in the present post-war uneasiness. Whatever may have been the demerits of the "imperialism" of the nineteenth century it cannot be denied that—let us face it—largely owing to the Royal Navy's maintenance of the *pax Britannica* which incidentally shielded the U.S.A's Monroe Doctrine, it put the preservation of internal security as a condition precedent to political and economic progress within the colonial territories whether under British or French or Belgian or Dutch or Portuguese control. While therefore it may be right in the twentieth century to recognize the insistence of demands for regional independence, it must also be accepted that development in the interests of the populations concerned cannot succeed without stability of the political and administrative systems involved.

It is not an accident that the growth of progressive ideas in colonial fields has coincided with more unrest than has ever been known before. Nor is it entirely the product of post-war malaise; it derives in no small measure from a, possibly, incorrect interpretation of the very beneficence of the new policies. In British colonial territories the impression of a diffidence in ruling has created an uncertainty which breeds dissension among the rival potential heirs to the apparently about to be vacated seat of authority and impels those, who know that whatever happens they will be the governed, to hasten to prostrate themselves before the rising power. The problem seems to turn on the nice adjustment of policy to the realities of human affairs. Because in the western hemisphere political progress makes it possible to use the ballot box with a moderate chance of ensuring general happiness and contentment—though startling exceptions have emerged to disconcert this complacency—that is no reason for imagining that elsewhere the same yardstick can be applied.

Again, even if modern governments have assumed responsibilities for arranging the conduct of the citizens' domestic affairs on an ever-widening scale, the application of those principles to regions where modernity has yet to assert itself may, to say the least of it, be premature. The difficulty lies in the ease with which the new instruments of public information and the increased rapidity of means of communication can be used by the educated minority to assert its will over the uneducated majority in a given area. The other day it was observed that the British colonial administrator was admirable in dealing with primitive peoples and in providing them with education and technical knowledge, but he was not so successful after the products of his instruction came to political puberty when they seemed inevitably to turn against him. How far that statement is more than superficially true may have to be examined. The current of events in India and Pakistan since the transfer of power certainly

does not endorse it if regard be had to the extremely friendly personal relationships existing in those countries with British residents, now mainly business men and—if officials—only advisers under contract. But India, Pakistan and Ceylon do not give an analogous basis of comparison with other Commonwealth territories inhabited by non-British stock. Their long-established civilizations with experience of government and administration stretching back several centuries had traditions enabling them to deal composedly with strangers in their midst, and to understand the graces of commercial intercourse. Burma has the same historical background despite the fact that her story has not been so happy for geographical and temperamental reasons. Heady nationalism has made her choose her freedom outside the Commonwealth ; it has not provided her as yet with the mature political judgment required to safeguard that freedom.

Briefly British policy in regard to the Commonwealth countries which have not yet reached the stature of full membership should avoid the extremes of tardy recognition of political aspirations and the rash application of so-called democratic plasters to all patients alike regardless of local realities. It may be convenient and not too disastrous for a Ministry to circularize all municipal bodies in the United Kingdom in the same terms as if the requirements and attainments of the councillors of Slocum-in-the-Marsh were equal to those of the aldermen of Leeds ; yet it might be better on occasions for the keen wind which blows in Whitehall to be tempered to the shorn lamb in Slocum High Street. To attempt to fit the variegated and manifold requirements of the colonial peoples to the dimensions of a single ministerial statement of policy would require the ruthlessness of a Procrustes.

Nowadays it is often said that a cause of labour unrest is the feeling of the remoteness and aloofness of the various boards which have replaced former ownership in public utility services. Such a feeling can much more readily grow in distant regions unless the fullest scope is given for the men in authority on the spot to preserve the personal touch which, inherent in the patriarchal system now fading out, is even more essential in the transitional stage from that system to forms of self-government. During that stage it is also important to judge what will be the ultimate consequences of the transfer of power. Inevitably the process of encouraging study of western methods of government must weight the scales in favour of the minority which have engaged therein, otherwise the policy itself is stultified. That should, however, not prevent solicitous examination of the prevalent social conditions so as to vindicate in the event the basic desire of the true democrat for the masses to have a square deal.

The proviso may retard political advancement to the point of

dismaying over-eager legatees, but courage in maintaining control of the brake as well as of the steering wheel is far more respectable than a hasty discharge of accepted obligations without any regard to the consequences for the people mainly concerned. The responsibilities which have been shouldered by the United Kingdom in its colonial territories and, indeed, by other colonial powers such as France, Holland, Belgium and the rest, have not been lightly treated. Standards have changed with the passing of the centuries since Spain and Portugal—following *longo intervallo* in the wake of Carthage and Imperial Rome—showed the way across the Atlantic and to the Pacific “Spice Islands”. To those changing standards in great measure—sometimes falteringly, sometimes precipitately—British policy has conformed. Now, when the world has shrunk to a size undreamed of by Jules Verne, and yet is more inaccessible than it has been for generations, it is important that sight should not be lost of the basis on which economic and political progress can alone be made by any nation or people, advanced or backward—the establishment and maintenance of the rule of law. To-day in many once fortunate countries of Europe that basis is, temporarily, no doubt, wanting. That is no reason for ignoring its essentiality. Indeed, the ardent advocate of an enlightened policy in the colonial regions should be the first to applaud full acceptance by the power concerned of the responsibility to ensure the prime requisite to social development. Between Campbell-Bannerman’s: “Good government is no substitute for self-government” and Pope’s: “Whatever’s best administered is best” a mean should be found.

No British Government can be happy in directing Commonwealth affairs if it considers the appalling apathy displayed by the public in this country in respect of the Commonwealth as a whole. The glowing period of Joseph Chamberlain’s crusade was dimmed by the later controversy over tariff reform. It is satisfactory to observe that excuse for apathy is less justified. The Prime Ministers’ periodical conferences have been a regular feature of London life for the last six years and ministerial conferences at Sydney and Colombo in this present year have managed to secure some meed of public attention. Recently the Stationery Office has issued an admirable handbook on the Commonwealth of Nations, *Origins and Purpose*, edited by Professor Vincent Harlow, and there have also been published W. R. Crocker’s *Self-Government for the Colonies* (Allen & Unwin) and John Coatman’s *British Family of Nations* (Harrap). No one can therefore complain of lack of guidance on this important question of the day. “If multilateral trade among members of the Commonwealth can be maintained alongside maximum co-operation in the programmes of European reconstruction and the development of Commonwealth resources, the Common-

wealth," says Professor Harlow, "can make a major contribution to the solution of the world's present economic difficulties."

Napoleon's "nation of shopkeepers" has returned to its last, just as in India and Pakistan the merchant venturers, after a century-and-half interlude as heirs to the Moghul Empire, are back at their desks, not as blood brothers of the ruling caste, but as business associates and technical co-operators in countries which first called their ancestors over 350 years ago. Trade is the lifeblood of the modern Britain whether the Government be socialist or non-socialist or a combination of both. The Commonwealth, comprising its full members and its numerous and varied territories in the seven seas, at different stages on the march to full membership, has to take its stand on commercial intercourse to which great maritime traditions make due contribution. If from this mighty partnership the desired benefits to itself and to the world as a whole are to flow, then the peoples of the Commonwealth and particularly those of the Metropolitan member must realize that Yelverton's two pillars, "religion and justice", have to uphold its policies. By religion in the broadest sense is meant freedom of faith and opinion, and by justice the proper observance and maintenance of the rule of law. Sacrifice is thus required before advantages; discipline before contentment.

The problem has thus been stated in the most general terms. Obviously it requires detailed treatment by commentators individually equipped to expound the particular needs of the many diversely situated and peopled territories, of the free association of which, to quote from the historic statement of the Prime Minister on April 27, 1949, the King is the symbol and head. The machinery of consultation between the Governments of the Commonwealth is designedly informal. Consideration of elaborate measures for giving a permanent system of organization, whether by the creation of a central secretariat or a kind of federated standing committee, has for the time being been rejected in order to preserve elasticity and adaptability suitable to the free institutions on which the Commonwealth is based. Under the strain of two world wars, the present century has seen the Commonwealth loosen its ties yet retain on great issues a unity which has strengthened its place in the councils of the nations and will, it is hoped, by reason of its own stability, ensure the restoration of world peace.

(The author was formerly the Editor of the Pioneer (Allahabad) and later Edited the North China Daily News of Shanghai)

OYSTER SHELLS, TASMANIA

BY CLIVE SANSOM

A mound of oyster-shells beneath my boot,
Brittle and white in the black loam.
Some time a blackfellow sat here,
Windbreak beside him,
Gazing across the same river
To the same gum-massed hills.
Behind, two hundred centuries,
Stretched his forgotten race,
Squatting over their oysters and crayfish,
Sheltering from the noon sea-breeze,
Watching the river and its moods
In all seasons.

Then came the white man
To startle the river with his white ships,
To scorn their lore and their legends,
To drive them up into the hills,
Back into the bush country,
Hunting them like kangaroo
For a slack day's sport.

And finally the kindly reservation
Where all those twenty thousand years
Died in a single life-span,
Died and dwindled into museum pieces,
Into a few tooled stones,
And heaps of oyster-shells
For the tourist's foot to crumble.

THE CONSCIENCE OF THE PRESS

BY W. L. ANDREWS

HOW can we get, and what are the chances of our getting, a better press ? Most reformers contemplate a press of the higher moral and intellectual standards urged upon us by the Royal Commission of 1947 to 1949. The newspaper profession would point at once to a more spacious journalism as our outstanding need. It would contend that we should achieve much the most effective reform as soon as the Government agreed to sanction enough newsprint for eight-page penny papers and sixteen-page twopenny ones. That would remedy the painful inadequacies of reporting and discussion to which I drew attention in an article "Cramping the Press" in THE FORTNIGHTLY of June 1948. But lack of space is not a fair answer to every complaint. Tacit admission of this will be found in all circles of journalistic statesmanship. The profession has turned its attention to questions of press improvement, and its collective hopes and intentions in this respect show a lively regard for the conscience of the press.

Efforts at newspaper self-reform, it must be said emphatically, are hindered by the bellicose atmosphere in which politicians declare them to be necessary. Those who are being assailed with bitter and unjust attacks cannot be expected to respond with martyr-like meekness. The British newspaper press to-day believes itself to be the victim of grievous injustice, first because that essential raw material, newsprint, is doled out to it so grudgingly and has been cut down in the face of increased national prosperity ; secondly because members of the Government so readily accuse newspapers and journalists of unworthy motives.

It is not long since public men saw in our press one of the moral bulwarks of the country. During the war, though its news and comments suffered from inevitable compression, it kept people informed, it stimulated and corrected, it criticized (in some quarters perhaps at times too fiercely) where it thought criticism would root out complacent inefficiency, and it did its duty as a watchdog of the people. To keep the mean between perilous blindness to error in high quarters and undue discouragement of those who are at their best when they trust their leaders became on many occasions a strain. Editors must have done their work patriotically and well, for not the

faintest tone of reproach emerged, indeed nothing but appreciation, in a speech Mr. Attlee made to provincial editors when the worst was over. "Free discussion, free criticism—whether in Parliament or on the platform or in the press—is the lifeblood of democracy," he said, "and I believe that in the freedom of our press we do set an example to the whole world. Criticism is education."

Nor was this grateful attitude merely a part of the comradeship of wartime when old differences are as nothing to the holding of a common front. Precedents for it abounded. The daily newspaper used to be hailed in Victorian times and afterwards as one of the wonders of the world. In 1892 it seemed natural for the Religious Tract Society to publish a book by H. W. Massingham, the famous Liberal editor, under the title *The London Daily Press*, in the strong belief that newspapers in general represented the better side of civilization. In an introduction the Society gently protested that some papers encouraged betting and gambling and reported sensational cases, but the general tone implied that all good hopes had a worthy ally in Fleet Street.

There has been an astonishing change since the Labour Party came into power. The press has become a whipping-boy for the socialists, who, because they dislike private enterprise, lash and kick it as heartily as they can. Here are some expressions of Ministerial opinion: "Suppressions, misrepresentations, inventions—these things happen day by day and constitute a disgrace to British journalism."—*Mr. Herbert Morrison, Lewisham, July 8, 1946.* "There never has been a time when certain sections of the press have more seriously abused the freedom which is accorded to them under the constitution. . ."—*Sir Hartley Shawcross, Battersea, July 19, 1946.* "Why should we let ourselves be scared by headlines in the Tory press—the most prostituted in the world, and mostly owned by millionaires? The national and provincial newspapers are pumping a deadly poison into the public minds week by week."—*Mr. Aneurin Bevan, Scarborough, May 16, 1948.*

These being the views of leaders who presumably know how to express themselves carefully and decorously, we may be sure that lesser politicians speak even more abusively. In this atmosphere of contempt and belittlement it has been easy for the Government to damage the press by restricting its sizes far too severely. Reductions were represented for a time as economic necessity, but of late it has hardly been concealed that some members of the Government wanted the press to be punished and controlled because it was not the kind of press they believed in. It has been said that if larger papers were allowed they would misuse the extra space for comic strips and more crime news—clearly not a charge of general application and in any event a gross exaggeration.

This offers an unpromising background to press efforts at improvement, for calumny is not the way to appeal to conscience. Nevertheless, self-defence has not ousted all thought of self-reform. The press, though assailed, is trying hard to raise its standards. Most of the chief subjects now being discussed by the great press societies (such as the Newspaper Proprietors' Association, the Newspaper Society, the Empire Press Union, the National Union of Journalists, the Institute of Journalists and the Guild of British Newspaper Editors) are intended to make newspapers more valuable to the public. The note of press society conferences is nearly always one of proud respect for a tradition of public service and integrity. Men of good purpose are striving to bring about a systematic national scheme of press training, a voluntary press council, with perhaps a court of honour to administer a code of honour, an interchange of journalists from different parts of the Commonwealth, and a reform of Colonial press laws which are too censorial.

Nor are the reformers confined to the ranks of the less prominent journalists who are free from the worries of keeping up dividends. The Seventh Imperial Press Conference, held at Quebec, Ottawa and Muskoka in June, and attended by newspaper owners and editors of high rank, the purple and ermine of the profession, as a Canadian writer put it, impressed me as above everything public-spirited. It was not in the least like a trade protection society. One found no concentration of demand upon "Hands off the press!" and "Down with Government controls!" The stirrings of conscience were more notable than any defiance of governmental authority.

Mr. Laurence Scott, chairman of the *Manchester Guardian*, showed himself the heir to a great tradition. He spoke as the voice of much newspaper opinion when he said he was inclined to think that many leaders of the press were "terribly self-satisfied", sure that they were always right and sure that Governments were always wrong. He asked why there was so much criticism by readers. Was it because newspapers were no longer newspapers but rather the largest entertainment industry in the world? Had they fallen under the domination of their circulation departments? Were they catering to vulgar public taste? Mr. Scott put his questions with a polite and even diffident air, but they go to the root of the matter. Perhaps one flaw can be detected in the case he advances. There is a good answer to his question why people criticize the press so much. That criticism, as the reader will have gathered already, has been instigated and stimulated by political opposition. The Aneurin Bevens, Morrisons, Shinwells and Shawcrosses are bound to have awakened echoes from one end of the country to the other. It has become fashionable to censure the press, just as at one time it became sure-fire

music-hall humour to gibe at Parliament as the national gas house and talking-shop.

What strikes me as remarkable is not that people criticize the newspapers so much but that they accept many of them so uncritically and, indeed, demand in very large numbers papers that offer little training in political consciousness. Mr. Scott might well have supported his case by citing the evidence of Mr. Arthur Hayes Sulzberger, the deeply-respected head (or publisher, in American parlance) of the *New York Times*, who said recently that it was more urgent for newspapers to inform a thousand readers than to entertain a million. Freedom of the press, Mr. Sulzberger reminded students, had not been gained on the assumption that newspapers would be instruments of entertainment only. The printed word was protected so that it might provide information on which people could base correct judgments.

Perhaps we should diverge here to admit the point, occasionally made in rather a pedantic spirit, that the freedom of the press, technically, is not the legal right that the public often imagines it to be and is, indeed, often encouraged to believe it to be. In Great Britain the liberty of the press is no greater and no less than the liberty of every subject. No privilege attaches to the position of the journalist. The freedom of the press we now enjoy has been defined as consisting in "printing without any previous licence subject to the consequences of the law"—for example, the consequences of law if a libel is committed or obscenity is printed.

This definition, it will be seen, covers every kind of writing in printed form. The freedom of the press is by no means restricted to news or what Mr. Sulzberger terms information on which people can base correct judgments. A magazine intended for adolescents who want to read only about stars of the cinema in a spirit of hero-worship is as fully protected by the freedom of the press as *THE FORTNIGHTLY* or *The Times*. But the long and glorious campaign for the freedom of the press, a campaign with many casualties and memories of the scaffold, prison and pillory, was never waged for the right to publish bright juvenile trivialities. It has been a political struggle to protect the citizen against official tyranny. Mr. Sulzberger is fully justified in his argument from press history. Technically, a paper that prints glittering superficialities with no thought but profit is within its rights, but morally it is doing nothing to justify the sacrifice of the pioneers, leaders and martyrs who gained freedom for the press.

Happily almost all our newspapers aim at being more than a branch of the entertainment industry, more even than being a branch of commerce. The skill with which some of them brighten the news into a serial story with breathless climaxes every day should not make us forget their value in explaining very simply, to those who would

yawn over anything complicated, the great world issues. The Government has no right to ask the press to fill all its news and editorial columns with politics and international strife. Lighter topics are welcome even amid the dignity and solemnity of *The Times*.

Now if so-called reforms, such as omission of purely entertaining features, were forced upon the press by the Government, freedom would be gone. The remedy would be worse than any suspected disease. We have seen what a Government-dictated press is like in Germany, Italy and Russia. Almost every Briton must have thought at one time or another that if we had that kind of press something vital and wholesome, something that gave us confidence, part of our protection against wrong and folly, would be gone from our common life. It would never do to let the Government suppress its critics and replace them with its creatures and sycophants.

Of press reforms that the press itself can do most to secure, the foremost now in hand is the better training of junior journalists. Such a weighty responsibility rests upon our newspaper men and women that they ought to be first-rate in knowledge and judgment. Their quality has improved greatly in recent years, partly because its increased prosperity has enabled the press to pay better salaries and attract boys of a higher level of education. Some people imagine the problem to be so simple that newspapers merely need for their improvement to get some of the best students from the universities, give them the necessary technical training (how to write shorthand, how to typewrite, how to choose type for headings, and so forth) and exclude those who, starting well down in a newspaper office as a telephonist or a sub-editor's message boy, long to become reporters. All editors of experience would condemn that doctrine of how to improve a staff. University graduates may become excellent for leader-writing. They sometimes become good editors. But they rarely become as keen news-getters as the early starters with brisk personalities and—this is most important—an eager feeling for news. We badly need the self-made men in journalism as well as the highly educated : we need W. T. Steads and J. L. Garvins as well as C. P. Scotts and J. A. Spenders.

The country office, not the university, is the traditional training ground for a journalist. The training there is usually good, but not always. Methods in some offices are haphazard and even slipshod. One editor trains his men in one way, the next in another way, and a third may take only the slightest interest in their technical progress, none indeed beyond the needs of his own paper. It is, indeed, a little surprising that country editors are usually so eager to help their young men when the more efficient the junior becomes the more

likely he is to fly away from the nest to a place where he can spread his wings more profitably.

The profession is now trying to fit together and extend various training schemes (including excellent ones in the Kemsley and Westminster press groups) in order that wherever a junior begins he will be trained on a wide systematic basis, in both the technicalities of the professions and good general culture. Negotiations have been going on for some time among proprietors, editors and trade unions, and we seem to be near the day when every recruit to British journalism will get a standard training, possibly with a diploma to show for it.

This should be all to the good, but a warning must be added. Members of the Royal Commission thought that lack of good training accounted for much of the trivial reporting in the press. They thought that poor reporters would not understand the finer points of discussion at, say, some important international conference and would be driven to describing merely superficial aspects. This, so far as our popular papers are concerned, is an almost comical misunderstanding. Those who bring out papers full of the trivial and superficial about international affairs do so intentionally knowing what a profitable business it can be. If they treat a world conference sketchily it is because they believe their readers like it treated that way. It is not that their reporters and sub-editors are tenth-rate. The popular papers can afford to pay generously for brains, and do.

Almost all editors favour better training, and are a little ashamed of the failings of the poorer papers. The proposal for a voluntary council of the press is a different affair altogether. Votes show an almost equal division of opinion in the profession. Those who favour a council point to the great advantages obtained from co-operation such as we have among proprietors in the Newspaper Proprietors' Association and the Newspaper Society, among Commonwealth enthusiasts in the Empire Press Union, and among rank and file journalists in the National Union of Journalists and the Institute of Journalists. Why not go a step further and organize a council to speak out not for proprietors alone, editors alone or working journalists alone, but for the press as a whole? It could encourage better knowledge of the great history that has established the press tradition of independence.

The council might be able to build up a code of honour by which every responsible journalist would wish to be bound. But until such a code is devised there would be danger in setting up what some have proposed, a court of honour to deal with alleged press offences. The methods of a press council would have to be not magisterial but persuasive and pervasive.

Those who object out and out to a press council scheme seem to be mainly actuated by a fear that a hostile Government at some future date might turn it into an organ for the State control of the press. No doubt many more clashes will come between those who believe in private enterprise and those who believe in the public control of every industry. But it seems odd to say in effect : " Let us refrain from fortifying the position of the press lest an enemy should capture the fortifications and turn them against us." If at some time a communist or other revolutionary party intended to destroy the private enterprise press as we know it, the existence or non-existence of a press council would not have the slightest effect upon it. At the worst a press council could not bring disaster any nearer. It might easily be a deterrent to a hostile Government if it won for us, as I think it would, the good opinion of the public. Indeed, the support of the public, the thoughtful and influential public, ought to be put in the forefront of our aims, along with more newsprint.

If we have lost the reputation we used to enjoy it ought to be possible to regain it with the help of a press council intent on journalistic self-defence and self-reform. The conscience of the press has been stirred. There is at last a widespread eagerness among editors for much higher standards among their staffs—better knowledge, better judgment, more conscientious ambitions. Can we not discern beyond those changes a straight and sound road towards better newspapers ?

(Mr. W. L. Andrews is the Editor and a director of The Yorkshire Post and a pioneer of a national training scheme for journalists. He was a delegate at the Imperial Press Conference in Canada.)

FARMING AND BRITAIN'S FOOD

BY GEORGE WINDER

WHILE most of us are aware that, since the beginning of the century, a revolution has been taking place in the agriculture of the western world, few of us realize the extent of that revolution in Great Britain, and, more particularly, the effect that changes abroad have had upon the agriculture of this country. Perhaps it would be more accurate to describe this modern revolution as the extension, to the land, of the industrial revolution of the nineteenth century—a development which was, for technical reasons, delayed for close on a century.

When Queen Victoria died, the horse was still the chief source of power on the British farm, supplemented, to a minor degree, by the steam engine. On the great prairies of America the mule was preferred, and harvesting with a team of thirty or more of these useful animals was not unknown. Within a few years of the commencement of the twentieth century the internal combustion engine was doing for agriculture what the steam engine had done for industry in the nineteenth. A horse could plough one acre a day. Many tractors can plough forty. In addition to this, the inventor has given the world the stripper and the combine harvester—implements many times more efficient than the reaper and binder which, in Great Britain, had not long superseded the scythe.

Such a revolution in agriculture could not be effected without many unpleasant repercussions on the British farmer, especially those more conservative men who clung instinctively to the mixed farming of their fathers. For such men, the repeal of the Corn Laws in 1846 had heralded a new age, but, for a generation, the results of this reform had been delayed. The importation of wheat increased, but at a price that did not seriously affect wheat production in this country. Indeed, the thirty years that followed the repeal of the Corn Laws have often been considered the golden age of British farming, although the agricultural worker did not share in its prosperity.

It was not until the 'eighties of last century that competition from the mule teams, and the vast new lands of America, began to have serious repercussions on the British farmer. It became no longer profitable to produce wheat in Great Britain, except in some favoured

areas such as East Anglia. With this blow to one of our chief sources of agricultural wealth, the whole prosperity of British agriculture declined.

Mr. O. J. Beilby, a very competent agricultural economist, has given index numbers for the agricultural production of England and Wales. Making the average production between the years 1927-1929 the basis of 100, he gives the following index figures :

	<i>Index Figure</i>			
1885-1889	-	-	-	94
1890-1894	-	-	-	93
1895-1899	-	-	-	85
1900-1904	-	-	-	82

From 1904 to the outbreak of the 1914-1918 war, there was a slight recovery. Between the war years the index figures reached 91, but dropped to 83 between 1922 and 1924. It was after this date that the agricultural revolution abroad—and particularly the application of the internal combustion engine to the production of grain—really began to be felt in Great Britain. Imported corn, which had been cheap before, became very, very cheap. Wheat, which was 58s. per quarter in 1873, and 31s. 9d. in 1913, was 23s. in 1933, although all other expenses had risen.

The period between the two wars became one of unrelieved gloom to those many farmers who remained true to the old traditions of mixed farming. This is the time, constantly referred to by farmers, when “the Government neglected agriculture.” Bankruptcies were frequent. Land under the plough was reduced from 12,399,000 acres in 1918 to 8,935,000 acres in 1939, which—according to the agricultural economist, Gregory King—was lower than in the days of William and Mary. Some 150,000 workers left agriculture, while one and a half million acres went out of production. Yet, against the impression left on the public mind of this period as one of disaster, we have the surprising statistical facts of agricultural production, which show, contrary to all popular ideas, that the time was one of undoubted recovery and expansion. Going back to Mr. O. J. Beilby's index figures, which between 1922 and 1924 we left at 83, we find the following rise in the index figure :

1924-1927	-	-	-	94
1928-1930	-	-	-	99
1931-1933	-	-	-	104
1934-1936	-	-	-	110

The explanation of this increase in agricultural production, coincident with land actually going out of cultivation, is that the British farmer was at last adapting himself to the greatly reduced price of wheat, and the new economic conditions forced upon him

by the application of science and the internal combustion engine to agriculture. The conservative farmer, who clung to his old ideas of mixed farming, was going bankrupt, but the enterprising modern farmer, who adapted himself to the conditions created by cheap imported wheat, was prospering. Arable and mixed farming were failing, while grass farming and animal husbandry and especially dairy farming, were taking their place. This is evident, if the statistics for the period are studied in more detail. The acreage under corn crops in 1939 shows a reduction, as compared with 1923, as follows :

Barley :	474,000 acres, a reduction of 32 per cent.
Oats :	870,000 " " " 25 per cent.
Peas, Beans :	209,000 " " " 50 per cent.

The acreage under wheat shows little change. It continued to fall until 1931, but, after that, it recovered as the result of the assistance given by the Wheat Act of 1932.

On the other hand, the expansion of animal husbandry is clearly evident. The figures for 1939 show the following increase over those of 1923 :

Cattle :	Increase of 1,108,000 head = 14 %
Sheep :	" " 5,802,000 " = 27 %
Pigs :	" " 1,401,000 " = 45 %

In 1931 the Agricultural Marketing Act was passed, but the subsequent increase in animal husbandry only carried on an expansion which, although interrupted by the great depression of 1930, was already evident before Government intervention.

These figures are sufficient to indicate that the period between the two wars was one, not of decay, but of transition and progress. There can be little doubt that this switch of emphasis from arable farming to animal husbandry, brought about inevitably by the development of the agricultural revolution, also suited the climatic conditions of Great Britain. Corn production in Great Britain has always been prejudiced by a rainfall too heavy for ideal growing and harvesting conditions, and, the further one travels west in the country, the more is this evident. Also, the great majority of the fields of Britain are too small for the use of modern harvesting implements. Australia and Canada, where fields are sometimes hundreds of acres in extent, are ideal for the use of such implements as the combine harvester.

Eighty per cent. of our farms are a hundred acres, or less, in extent, and their small ditched-and-hedged fields are ideal for animals, which should be compelled to graze closely one field before passing to another. Such fields are entirely unsuited to the use of a combine harvester, and the capital expenditure involved in the purchase of such implements is, more often than not, completely unjustified. In

those cases where the fields on British farms are large enough for the use of a combine harvester, as on some of our chalk downs, the land is often too poor to produce reasonable crops without a wasteful expenditure on fertilizers.

On the other hand, the lush grass produced by our rainfall has always made Great Britain an ideal country for the grazing of animals. Our beef and veal production, before the war, was greater than in any of the Dominions. Our yearly average, between 1935 and 1939, was 620,000 tons, against Australia's 531,000 tons, and Canada's 328,000 tons. Our average pig population for the same years was 4,464,000. Amongst the Dominions, Canada was the most outstanding with 4,151,000. Denmark, a country famous for bacon, averaged a pig population of 2,997,000. Our dairy cow population compared well with that of the Dominions, as the following table of "average cow populations" for those years shows :

Canada :	3,780,000
Australia :	3,343,000
Britain :	3,291,000
New Zealand :	1,722,000

Denmark possessed only 1,609,000 cows. Great Britain is endowed by nature with every advantage for animal husbandry. Although, in a good year, her corn output per acre is very high, she is, in every other respect, entirely unsuited to corn production.

Between the wars, the British farmer was giving up his fight against cheap imported grain and feeding stuffs, and was turning this flood of imports, which at first appeared to be his misfortune, into the basis of a new prosperity. He was complying with the first law of survival in adapting himself to new economic conditions. British farming was no longer being considered as a separate and independent entity. It was being integrated with farming in the Dominions and with the rest of the world.

The Dominions and America were producing cheap wheat and animal feeding stuffs, which were fast becoming the basic raw materials of a great expansion in animal husbandry and specialized poultry farming in Great Britain. Dairy farms were being developed, depending for their great production of milk—especially winter milk—largely on imported foods, while specialized pig farms, and specialized poultry farms, purchasing their feeding stuffs from abroad, were responsible for an unprecedented production of pork, bacon, and eggs. When the 1939-1945 war interrupted this peacetime progress, this development was still in its infancy. The characteristic features of the new form of grass farming, as opposed to arable farming—or, to express it in another way, specialized farming as opposed to mixed farming—were only just beginning to emerge and to be

recognized. The system had been in existence too short a time for the British people to realize its possibilities. If, after the war, the system had been continued, there is no reason why Great Britain should not, by now, be producing all the fresh milk, poultry, eggs and pork she requires, and the greater part, if not all, of her beef and mutton requirements.

Wheat and animal feeding stuffs would cost us dollars, but we would save a very much greater quantity of dollars in being able to produce the more expensive protein and protective foods at home. War, however, and subsequent Government legislation, have nipped this great British agricultural development in the bud. The Government, by failing to import sufficient quantities of wheat and animal feeding stuffs, and by guaranteeing the price of home-grown cereals, has brought about a return to the old system of mixed farming, which failed us so badly in the past. Arable and mixed farming are once again in the ascendant, but their development is largely at the expense of animal husbandry.

Although large sums of money have been spent by the Government to help all kinds of farming, the returns for post-war agriculture show clearly that this expenditure has been more encouraging to arable farming than to animal husbandry. All arable farming has expanded considerably, but animal husbandry, with the exception of cattle, not at all. These figures make the position perfectly clear :

1949 Compared with 1939.

Wheat acreage :	11 per cent. increase over 1939
Barley :	100 per cent. " " "
Oats :	33 per cent. " " "
Cattle population :	15 per cent. " " "
Sheep " "	27 per cent. decrease from 1939
Pig " "	35 per cent. " " "

Although, in 1949, for the first time since the war, there has been a slight increase in the number of poultry, the production of eggs is still down, owing to the absence of suitable balanced mash.

These figures are enough to indicate that, since the war, legislation has reversed the natural development of our agriculture, which had been taking place ever since the machine replaced the horse, and which was integrating our farm production with that of the Dominions and other oversea corn-producing countries. Arable farming has once more been placed in the lead.

This return to the arable and mixed farm has one apparent advantage. It means that each individual farm, provided it is sufficiently large, can be more or less self-contained. It can produce the finished beef animal, or the whole output of milk, without going beyond the boundaries of the farm for its supplies. Such farming need not be integrated in any way with farming oversea. Against

this rather doubtful advantage, it must be remembered that a self-sufficient agriculture, in this densely populated island with more than 700 persons to the square mile, can, at best, only feed a very small proportion of our population. As we have to import a large part of our food, it will pay us to import that class of food forming the raw material enabling our own farms to produce their maximum.

Our own farms should produce, roughly, half the food we require, but not half of all the types of food we require. They should specialize in producing those commodities they can most economically and efficiently produce. These, fortunately, are the more expensive necessities—the protein foods, such as milk, meat, and eggs. We should leave the Dominions and the rest of the world to produce for us the less expensive foods, such as grain and animal feeding stuffs. Mixed arable farming should not have Government support, and the natural trend towards grass and specialized farming, which had developed between the wars, should be free again to continue its progress.

The possibility of another war is sometimes given as the reason for Government support of mixed and arable farming. It is, of course, true that, in times of war, if we cannot keep command of the sea, we may be compelled to revert to arable farming and to grain crops, but, in this event, the peacetime policy of feeding rich imported feeding stuffs to animals brings its rewards. Animals so fed, distribute in their dung an especially rich fertility over the fields. This fertility, in times of peace, is banked up year after year under the grass, and gives us excellent fields on which to produce arable crops. Such fields, at the beginning of the last war, gave us two, or even three, years of corn production without the addition of fertilizers. If they had been used to grow wheat in times of peace, they would have been useless for this purpose when cut off, by war, from artificial fertilizers. As far as retaining the farmer's skill in the growing of grain is concerned, the growing of grass leys develops similar skill, and such arable crops as kale will always be produced, while, even without State encouragement, some wheat will be produced in such favoured localities as East Anglia.

Whether we like it or not, the destiny of 50,000,000 Britons crowded in this tiny island and in Northern Ireland now depends upon the importation of a large percentage of their food. If we wish to make the most of our agricultural land, we must allow the interrupted agricultural revolution to renew its course. Our agriculture must be integrated, at least, with the agriculture of the Dominions, if not with the agriculture of all grain-growing countries.

If the Government insists on helping agriculture, then it should see that the assistance encourages, and does not divert, the natural

development of the industry. Politics have, for the time being, delayed the natural development of British agriculture. If we can get politics out of agriculture, that development in Great Britain, brought about by the world-wide twentieth century agricultural revolution, will be renewed. Animal husbandry and poultry husbandry, based on cheap imported feeding stuffs, can help to make our people once again the best fed people on earth.

(The author, a farmer, writes from Sussex.)

ELEGY IN A KENSINGTON CHURCHYARD

BY MURIEL SPARK

Lady who lies beneath this stone,
Pupil of Time pragmatical,
Though, in a lifetime's cultivation
You did not blossom, summer shall.

The fierce activity of grass
Assaults a century's constraint.
Vigour survives the vigorous,
Meek as you were, or proud as paint,

And bares its fist for insurrection,
Clenched in the bud ; lady who lies,
Those leaves will spend in disaffection
Your fond estate and purposes.

Death's a contagion, spring's a bright
Green fit : the blight will overcome
The plague that overcame the blight
That laid this lady low and dumb,

And laid a parish on its back,
So soon amazed, so long enticed
Into an earthy almanack,
And musters now the spring attack :
Which render passive, latent Christ !

THE PEN CLUB AND ITS FOUNDER

BY D. L. HOBMAN

THE PEN Club held its twenty-second International Congress in Edinburgh in August, enabling its members to enjoy the dramatic and musical pleasures presented during the Edinburgh Festival. Authors from many nations will return home from their literary discussions with a new conception of the regard for art in Britain. That is as it should be, and all in accordance with the desire of the founder, Mrs. Dawson Scott. In her lifetime she was affectionately known in Central Europe as the Little Mother of the PEN, a title which gave her immense satisfaction and was her reward for having created a world-wide association of writers—poets or playwrights, essayists and novelists.

Her English friends may have thought the name incongruous as applied to the stout formidable little figure, with her piercing grey eyes, her forthright manner, her gusto and her wrath. Yet the foreigner who first thought of it perhaps had a deeper insight than theirs into her character, and her secret conception of herself as the brooding eternal mother-figure. She was a novelist and most of her books reveal her preoccupation with an ideal mother-child relationship, which sprang from natural feeling and may also have been a kind of compensation for the lack of maternal tenderness in her own early life. She had a step-mother bound by a coldly rigid conception of duty and religion, and for a time was sent to a boarding-school kept by a relative, who believed in plenty of punishment, and had no understanding of imaginative little girls.

Catherine Amy Dawson was born in Dulwich in 1865, and came of long-lived vigorous stock. Her father married for the third time when he was over eighty, and her grandfather lived to be nearly a hundred; he was a man of character and public spirit, broad-minded enough to contribute to the building of an Anglican church, although himself a Wesleyan. She had a lifelong habit of making up stories, and while at school kept the girls in her bedroom amused at night by relating them. She was forbidden the use of pen and ink to write them down, and on one occasion she pricked her arm and wrote a poem in her own blood, a romantic action which must have thrilled her schoolfellows into terrified admiration. She was miserable at school, and it was a relief when her family moved from

the district and she was sent to an Anglo-German day-school at Camberwell. There she learned to speak German, and there the interest in foreign countries which later was to become a passion with her, was first aroused. Her mind was open to the current of new ideas ; she believed fervently in feminism, and shook off the religious doctrine in which she had been brought up, partly perhaps under the influence of her employer, a scholarly blind old man to whom she went as reader and secretary when she first left school. Dr. Jennings must have found pleasure in helping to develop the mind of the eager young girl with the lovely voice ; he taught her Greek, and his influence is evident in her first long poem, " Sappho ", which deals with the training of women. It is filled with youthful aspiration :

O woman ! you have set
 A fence, a fence, and everywhere a fence
 About your steps, until you only know
 To turn in the same paths your mothers trod.
 The age expands in knowledge, but you stand
 Content with your monotonous estate,
 Dreading to follow each her diverse bent
 Lest ye exchange the less for greater ills.
 Be braver ! Let the thinker go, nor bind
 Her soul to household trifles—
 Let the maidens toil,
 Run, leap, and wrestle—they shall bear strong fruit
 In after-years. How ? Think you God hath given
 Our talents to be rusted, laid aside,
 Useless because a woman's ?

After four years in her post she felt that it was time to make herself free and independent, and announced her intention of leaving home. Nowadays one can hardly imagine the outraged reaction of a middle-class family fifty years ago, at the suggestion of a young unmarried daughter going away to live in London ; however, when the girl happened to be as definite about what she wanted as Kate, and as determined to get it, nobody could prevent her. She took a flat and was presently joined there by her sister ; there was nothing left for the family to do about it, except to have prayers offered publicly in church for two young girls, " who had been led astray." Sappho, as she liked her friends to call her, was undisturbed by reproaches and prayers alike. She supported herself by journalistic work, wrote poetry, made literary friendships, went to parties, attended publishers' luncheons, gained an entry into the *Yellow Book* circle, and generally made the most of her opportunities. In youth as in age she loved fun and excitement and gaudy colours, and—to quote from one of her letters—" wild sort of men." She professed to believe that there was gypsy blood in her veins and, whether there was or not, she often liked to behave in accordance with her theory.

The romantic bachelor-girl existence came to an end with her marriage in 1896. Dr. Scott was anything but a wild sort of man, and one can only suppose that those two were drawn together by the attraction of opposites. He was assistant to one of the Queen's physicians, and was occasionally called in to attend upon minor members of the Royal household ; the correct doctor, going down St. James's Street to Buckingham Palace in his grey frock coat and top hat, may not have been without moments of misgiving when he contemplated his unconventional and impulsive bride. " You have married a gypsy, a mermaid, something that isn't altogether human, and if you can't hold me, I must go," says a character in one of her books, and even if she never uttered those words herself, they probably reflected her feelings about her own nature. For some years the young wife was kept occupied by her three children, and by a social round as agreeable in its way as the Bohemian gaiety to which she had grown accustomed. But eventually Dr. Scott decided that the seaside would be better than London for his family, so he bought a practice in Cowes.

The Isle of Wight may have been healthier for the children, but for Catherine, unable to adapt herself to small-town provincial life, it soon became an island of stagnant boredom. In desperation she began again to write, novels and plays, one play together with Edward Knoblock, which however was never performed. In the end, for lack of suitable schools, Dr. Scott moved again, to Southall, near London. His wife, having by this time achieved some reputation, was thus able to re-enter the literary world, to resume old friendships and make new ones with well-known writers, May Sinclair, Violet Hunt and others. Her own books were well received, usually greeted by an encouraging chorus of praise from the reviewers. She wrote a series of Cornish novels, vivid if at times overlaid with local colour in the matter of dialect and names. She knew how to tell a story, and was not afraid of dealing with earthy delights of the body, with food and drink. She had vigour and originality, but popular as her novels were when they appeared, they are too romantic for modern taste.

At the outbreak of the 1914-1918 war Dr. Scott went to France, leaving the practice to be sold, and Mrs. Dawson Scott to struggle along as best she could, writing and bringing up her children. She could deal with difficulties, because there were two sides to her nature, practical as well as imaginative. Just as she could be implacably hostile towards people who had offended her and passionately loyal to those for whom she cared, so she could be clear-sighted as well as idealistic, hard as well as emotional. In her novel *The Caddis-Worm*, she described a woman novelist who might have been herself : " Like all adventurers, Mary Lake's life had been crowded and lonely. She had a large acquaintance, she had aided many during those times of

stress which come to all alike, and these called her 'friend'. To them she felt kindly, but they did not rouse in her any warmth of feeling. Now and again she had suffered from a passionate attachment, but such love passes, and her affections were mainly intellectual."

She showed her organizing ability by founding the Women's Defence Relief Corps, in order to release men by substituting women for their posts. On one occasion, when she had been speaking on behalf of the Corps, a little girl came up to the platform and presented her with a bouquet. Mrs. Dawson Scott thanked the child without accepting it, adding: "Now take it away and give it to somebody else who likes flowers." The remark was characteristic of the woman who hated cut flowers, would not wear furs lest they had been taken from trapped animals, and never hesitated to speak her mind. Another society which she created was the Tomorrow Club, for young unknown writers, and its success first gave her the idea of an international organization for authors of established reputation.

In 1921 an American woman author came to London, and Mrs. Dawson Scott wrote to her daughter: "There was no organization to receive her and put her wise to our movements in literature. If we had an International Dinner Club with centres in every capital town in the world, membership of one meaning membership of all, we should have a common meeting-ground in every country for all writers." And again, "You know, Marjorie, the PEN is the first attempt to gather all the world of writers into one band. It may not succeed. People are inert and lazy and unsocial. They won't help you or back you or do anything. Well, you know that they *are* like that; but one makes a little beginning. Apparently most people think the *idea* is all right."

From the beginning she looked beyond the social pleasures of a dining-club: she believed that it was in the power of authors to achieve world peace if they used their pens against war, and if they refused to encourage racial antagonisms. Because such a society was a step towards international co-operation, Galsworthy accepted her request to become its first President, an office which he held for more than ten years. The opening meeting of the PEN Club was held on November 4, 1921. Mrs. Dawson Scott's daughter Marjorie acted as the first secretary until her marriage to Arthur Watts, the *Punch* artist, in 1926. Then Hermon Ould, the present secretary, took over the office, and under his tactful and devoted guidance the club has grown and expanded in many directions. At one time there was even a junior offshoot, referring irreverently to the parent body as the Fountain Pen. To-day there are several thousand members all over the world, representing forty or more different national centres, most of which—surprisingly including Japan—managed somehow to continue to function all through the war.

Incidentally, the Japanese PEN Club recently passed a peace resolution at a special meeting in Hiroshima, "which is the first place of sacrifice for an atomic bomb."

The PEN is non-political, for which it is frequently blamed by extremists of all parties. The first clause in its Charter states that : " Literature, national though it be in origin, knows no frontiers, and should remain common currency between nations in spite of political or international upheavals." It declares works of art to be the heritage of all mankind, and pledges itself to do everything possible to dispel hatred between races, classes and nations, and to uphold the principle of a free press and freedom of expression. This no doubt accounts for the aloofness of Russian writers from contact with such an organization, and for the withdrawal of the Germans after Hitler's rise to power. German immigrant authors, as well as Austrian and Catalan, formed their own national groups in London, and refugee intellectuals were assisted in many ways. The English PEN acted in an advisory capacity to the Home Office, concerning their status as aliens, and helped with friendship and money. Writers in exile are more forlorn than musicians or painters, because their very instrument of language increases their limitation.

The spirit of the club does not depend on bricks and mortar, and there is no clubhouse in London, although at Glebe House in Chelsea, the official headquarters, discussion meetings and small parties are frequently held. English authors usually belong to special clubs of their own and do not perhaps always take their membership quite as seriously as their continental colleagues. The influence of the PEN is as intangible as its living-space, but none the less widespread. Local centres can have an integrating effect in countries with more than one language and culture ; foreign writers find a welcome wherever they go ; literary problems are discussed, varying from translation and the prospect of a universal language to the tendencies and technique of modern poetry. In Edinburgh, for example, there were resolutions dealing with television and its relation to literature, and with the commercialization and standardization of books through book clubs and so on, and there was a joint Conference with Unesco on " The Writer and the Idea of Freedom."

The international congress is the highlight of the year, and each is memorable in its own way. Thus there was the congress in Yugoslavia in 1933, when the German delegates rose in a body, clicked their heels and marched out of the hall ; Copenhagen in 1948, when the German club was reinstated, and French and Germans shook hands on the platform ; Paris before the war, when a generous French Government opened "*La Maison Internationale des PEN Clubs*," with bedrooms available for visitors ; Holland, when on an occasion almost unique, the pictures in the famous gallery were floodlit ;

Stockholm in 1946, the first open gateway after the long isolation of war ; dazzling Venice last year, when a former mistress of Mussolini gatecrashed her way into an excursion coach, and had to be forcibly ejected ; last, not least, hospitable Scotland. If it seems as though the lavish entertainment provided by the various Governments is more attractive than debates and resolutions, that is quite in keeping with the ideas of the founder. Nobody loved a jaunt better than Mrs. Dawson Scott, and nobody knew better that in order to establish international friendship one must first be in a position to enjoy the company of those with whom one wishes to be friends.

The PEN Club was not her only interest. She was left a widow after the first war, and still had to struggle to earn her living ; she turned to spiritualism, wrote books on psychic phenomena and founded the Survival League. She developed a taste for the simple life and went often to her beloved Cornwall, where she spent her last summer in a bell tent near Padstow, walking barefoot about the countryside, or sitting on her camp bed, cross-legged in gypsy fashion, typing out her manuscripts. She died after a short illness in 1934, in her seventieth year.

And so there passed from the contemporary stage a vital figure, who had played her rôle gallantly in the drama of our time. She made her exit, as it were trailing her scarlet velvet gown, and defiantly flashing at the audience the brilliant jewellery which she had always loved to display. The applause has died down long ago, but the Little Mother of the PEN has her memorial in her own creation, the club of which H. G. Wells, its second President once said : “ We are only part of a long and varied front. The PEN is an international of journalism and writers generally, working side by side with the internationals of science and the freemasonry of art and technical work, for steadfast creativeness. Faced with the uproar and violence of contemporary affairs the PEN Club in its own fashion maintains the concept of an intellectual and aesthetic world republic ; it asserts its faith in the ultimate triumph of the free brotherhood of mankind. Men must age and men must pass but the life of which our work is part need have no end.”

THE FORTNIGHTLY LIBRARY

BURNS OF BATTERSEA

BY G. F. MCCLEARY

SIXTY-ONE years ago, in the autumn of 1889, I saw John Burns for the first time. It was two months after the London dockers, largely through his efforts, had won their strike for a wage of 6d. per hour, and he was in Hyde Park addressing a crowd of bakers on strike. When I arrived he was sitting in a cart with the other speakers awaiting his turn. With his bowler hat on the back of his head, and sucking a lemon, he was not an impressive figure. But when he stood up and began to speak he seemed transformed. His black beard and bushy eyebrows, his piercing eyes, his powerful voice, his unhesitating flow of arresting phrases, and his expressive gestures exercised a strange magnetism over his hearers ; one felt in the presence of a great moving spirit.

I first met him twelve years later, when I called on him shortly after taking up my duties as medical officer of health of Battersea. He had then become one of the best-known public men of the time. He had represented Battersea on the London County Council since 1889, and in Parliament since 1892. Though not born in Battersea, he had lived there nearly all his life, and had become so influential that he was described by Mr. Bernard Shaw as "Emperor of Battersea." Under his influence the Battersea Borough Council, of which, however, he was never a member, had built up a reputation as an enterprising local authority, and Battersea was widely known as a "municipal Mecca".

I have a vivid recollection of my first talk with John Burns, nearly fifty years ago. It was a stimulating experience. He had a great command of the spoken word and a prodigious memory ; his mind was richly stored with recollections of things that had

happened to him in his varied career, of people he had known, of public affairs, and of books. I had heard him speak impressively in public, but was hardly prepared for the vigour, the wit, and the variety and charm of his conversation. From him I learnt much of Battersea, which, he said, was a borough "whose face is turned towards the light." I later received valuable help from him in carrying out my official work.

At this first interview with him I reminded him of his Hyde Park speech to the bakers on strike, and told him how it had changed the course of my life. He at once replied : "And, Doctor, what a speech ! Oh, what a speech it was ! Here it is." And without the slightest hesitation he opened a drawer, and took out the manuscript of the speech which he had delivered twelve years earlier. He told me that each of the numerous drawers in his library contained papers relating to a year of his public life. He was proud of his library, which even in 1901, in spite of his poverty, was extensive. Mr. Kent suggests* that Burns was not deeply read in his own library books, but I hardly ever took down one of them without finding notes or newspaper cuttings ; and he could put his hand instantly on anything he wanted—to verify a quotation or for any other purpose. When he became a cabinet minister I remember hearing him warned that he would be vigorously attacked by the Labour Party. He waved his hand to his books and replied : "What harm can they do to a man with a library like this ?"

Burns was endowed with intense vitality and an enormous capacity for enjoyment. When, in 1905, he became president of the Local Government Board he entered upon his

* *John Burns* by William Kent. *Williams and Norgate*. 25s.

ministerial duties with gusto ; he enjoyed even the gold braid side of his office. His official uniform appealed to his sense of humour. He once told me that the first time he put it on his young son remarked : " Father, your disguise does suit you well." He played his many parts in life with zest, and his activities ranged over a wide field. In the later years of his parliamentary career, he derived much satisfaction from taking parties of American or Dominion visitors over the Houses of Parliament and imparting appropriate historical information. It was on one of these occasions that he made his famous reference to the Thames as " liquid history ". Mr. Kent's version of this incident differs from the account given to me by Burns himself many years ago, which, to the best of my recollection, ran thus. Having led a party of Americans over the building, he emerged with them on the terrace and with a wave of his hand towards the river said : " Gentlemen, the River Thames." " Well, Mr. Burns," said one of the party, " It's not a large river. I should like you to see some of our rivers. I should like you to see the Hudson and the Mississippi." " Sir," said Burns, " I've seen the Hudson ; it's water. I've seen the Mississippi, it's dirty water. The Thames is liquid history." He once assured me that by this saying alone, if by nothing else, his name would go down to posterity.

Burns had a keen relish for his own *bons mots*, and would dispense them freely to appreciative listeners. One from which he derived special satisfaction related to the unexpected appearance of an undistinguished name in a list of political awards. " In the Middle Ages," said Burns, " knights went about in shining armour ; now they go about in black mail."

When Burns became a cabinet minister he had opportunities such as come to few statesmen. The country was ripe for a great development of public health administration. He was keenly interested in public health, but he did not fully seize his opportunities.

With all his high qualities he lacked the concentrated, silent, peg-away industry required for commanding a great department of State and steering an important controversial Bill through Parliament. When the big public health measure came, it took the form of Mr. Lloyd George's National Insurance Bill.

Burns had many faults, and they are certainly not minimized by Mr. Kent. But he had also many admirable qualities, and, when all is said, he was a great man. Unlike one of his famous contemporaries, he did not regard the rest of the human race as a lot of insects. He liked his fellow-man—except perhaps when he appeared as a professional rival—and he liked children still more. He himself was very likable, and was well liked by many who were most clearly aware of his failings. Despite all that appears to his disadvantage in Mr. Kent's book I rise from its perusal with enhanced respect and affection for my old friend.

THE SECOND WORLD WAR, Vol.

III : The Grand Alliance, by Winston S. Churchill. *Cassell*. 25s.

This volume covers the year 1941. Perhaps the reader will not experience the same sense of exhilaration that carried him through its two predecessors. There is less of the personal narrative, fewer stirring passages and arresting phrases. With the growing strength of Britain, the involvement of Russia and the mounting participation of the United States, the tension and tragedy of 1940 slowly give way to a growing certainty of victory. Britain could no longer utterly lose the war and after Pearl Harbour was almost bound to win it as a member of the Grand Alliance.

But to anyone who wants to know how things really happened, this volume is intensely absorbing. It deals with a series of doubtful and controversial episodes—the Greek campaign, the battle of Crete, the replacement of Wavell, the American part in the struggle before Pearl Harbour, the

"Second Front" and the Anglo-American plans for the reconquest of Europe and the Pacific. The mists of speculation, in which they have been largely enveloped, begin to dissolve in the light of contemporary official documents. As a result a great deal of partisan theory and propaganda is swept away into the limbo of nonsense.

Take Greece. It has been freely alleged that the decision to send British troops to reinforce the Greek Army was taken without full consideration of the risks involved, against the wishes of the Greek Government, against the views of General Wavell. All these suppositions are now seen to be groundless. There were miscalculations as to the overwhelming effect of German air supremacy, the powers of resistance of the Greek Army and the forces needed to hold Libya against the German elements gathering under Rommel in Tripoli, but everyone agreed that the risks were great and that they had to be run. The final judgment on the political and the military consequences of this bold decision is unlikely to be adverse.

The "Second Front" was demanded by Marshal Stalin within a few weeks of the invasion of Russia. In fact, the Soviet-German pact had destroyed the natural second front in France and the passivity of Russia in the face of the German occupation of Rumania, Bulgaria and Yugoslavia had ensured the failure of our attempt to build a second front in the Balkans. Still, as Russia was struggling desperately against the bulk of the German army and air force, the demand was natural enough. But the Germans still had more divisions in the west than we had in Great Britain. We had no shipping or landing-craft to transport an army to the Continent and could not have protected it against air attack. In 1941 or in 1942 a cross-channel operation could have resulted in nothing but a "bloody repulse". Had the first attempt ended in disaster, it could hardly have been repeated.

But Mr. Churchill was resolved that

the invasion of Europe should be undertaken as soon as it was technically possible. Throughout 1941 he was hoping that complete victory in North Africa would make "Whipcord" possible, the occupation of Sicily and the opening of a second front in Italy. At the end of the year in his memorandum, which formed the basis of Anglo-American planning, he proposed to liberate Europe in 1943 by landing British and American armies not only in Italy "and possibly the Balkans", but also in Norway, Denmark, the Low Countries and France, as opportunity offered. But things did not go according to plan. Instead of the whole of North Africa being secured in 1942, it was not cleared till May 1943. The great cross-Channel expedition had to be postponed another year. Mr. Churchill adds: "Subsequent reflection and the knowledge we now possess have convinced us that we were fortunate in our disappointment . . . The attempt to cross the Channel in 1943 would have led to a bloody defeat of the first magnitude with measureless reactions on the result of the war."

Perhaps the outstanding impression of this book is of the sureness and determination of British and American leadership. On the one side Churchill and the Chiefs of Staff, Wavell on land and Cunningham at sea, never afraid of big decisions, never cloaking indecision in vague compromises. On the other Roosevelt, convinced that America must fight, with Marshall, King and Hopkins not less resolute behind him. As early as January 1941 co-operation was established between the British and American Staffs, which grew steadily in scope and intimacy. The Lend Lease Act, the Draft Law, repeal of the Neutrality Act, American bases in Greenland and Iceland, the Atlantic Charter, American air-patrols and destroyer escorts in the Atlantic, the first engagements with U-boats, all followed in due course, to say nothing of unlimited supplies to Britain and Russia.

But when Pearl Harbour came, the

broad lines of political and military strategy had to be agreed and a comprehensive Anglo-American war-machine had to be designed and set in motion. All that was done in conference at Washington within a month of the Japanese attack. Surely this was the greatest and most decisive joint operation of President Roosevelt and the "former naval person", whose character and achievements stand out in such massive relief from the pages of this book.

HAROLD BUTLER.

MODERN CAPITALISM AND ECONOMIC PROGRESS, by Thomas Wilson. *Macmillan*. 12s. 6d.

ECONOMICS OF EVERYDAY LIFE, by Gertrude Williams. *Pelican Books*. 1s. 6d.

A don at the hustings is seldom an elevating spectacle. The dust of recent battle hangs thickly over Mr. Wilson's book. As an attack by a professional economist upon the post-war British experiments in Socialism it nevertheless merits serious consideration both by conservatives who feel the need for skilled advocacy in their electioneering and labourites who wish to sharpen their wits. The intention is to defend modern capitalism, by which is meant private enterprise and the flexible mechanism of the market, and to show that it is economically superior and more 'progressive' than Socialism, by which is meant State ownership and pervasive planning. The method followed is first to indicate ways in which the notorious immoralities and inefficiencies of capitalism can by judicious reforms be removed quicker and more effectively without Socialism, and then to concentrate the attack upon the difficulties of central planning. Thus while accepting in principle the inequality of earned incomes, private ownership of capital, inheritance and the receipt of unearned incomes, he summons the ghost of Lloyd George to bless Mr. Eden's "property owning democracy" as the only truly democratic policy. He accepts the need for

radical reforms and considerable redistribution of wealth (even by capital levies and a gifts tax) and many other social changes of the past decade, but in contending that the conservatives must be regarded as the principal defenders of the liberal tradition he wistfully admits "they do not always give the impression of being the most stalwart champions."

The attack upon central planning develops on the usual lines, with shrewd hits at the imprecision of physical controls formulated upon guesswork and inadequate data, the restrictive practices of labour and its slow readjustment to full employment conditions, and the many other inherent contradictions and inconsistencies of a transition period. But the inconsistencies of the attack are also numerous; socialists and the die-hard planners are at once criticized for their "extraordinary diversity of views" and their "doctrinaire dogmas", their unresponsive inflexibility and their experimental vagueness and lack of a master-plan. Dealing with the balance of payments, our declining staples, and the need for timely changes in the structure of our economy if structural unemployment is to be avoided, Mr. Wilson writes more as an economist and is at his best; but dealing with depreciation and wage-inflation he is politically naïve to express surprise at the resentment by the organized worker of rationing by the purse, and his incursions into the law of restraint of trade and patents contain misleading and outdated comments. If the Red bogey-mania and irrelevant comparisons with Soviet totalitarianism can be ignored, and due allowance made for the intolerant spirit in which his book was written, Mr. Wilson's panegyric on capitalism has weight, versatility and a profusion of apt statistics, a logical exposition and incisiveness in debate. It is equally good value as canvassing fodder for the believer and as entertainment for the critic.

Mrs. Williams is a don too, but she

employs her didactic skill to spread knowledge rather than to prove a case. Her understanding of human society is broader and she allows for the variability of human actions : " we are not robots, and there is no such thing as economic man." In homely language she discusses those aspects of economics which directly impinge upon the daily life of the ordinary citizen : prices and wages, the function of money and credit, the retail market, the dollar gap and international trade. Comparing price-economy and planned-economy she makes the simple point, largely ignored by Mr. Wilson, that the usual aim of the latter is to use the productive resources to make a different pattern of society from the one that would have resulted from the pull of prices. When discussing the planned location of industry the importance not only of the purely economic factors but also of social capital—the social vitamins derived from the intricate relationships of an established community as well as drainage and other installed services—is given due attention. She is fair when outlining the arguments for and against advertising, planning, and even equal pay for women. Like Mr. Wilson she points to the danger of bolstering up obsolete jobs in the name of full employment, but is more candid about the difficulties of a national wages policy. The only conclusion drawn in this competent and most readable little book, consoling to the layman if exasperating to the seeker after ultimate truth, is that there is no simple answer to most economic questions and the man with a panacea is not to be trusted.

EWAN WALLIS-JONES.

PALESTINE UNDER THE MANDATE, by A. M. Hyamson. *Methuen*. 12s. 6d.

This compendious and well-written book tells the bitter-sweet—or perhaps more accurately, sweet-bitter story of the British Mandatory Administration in Palestine. As a British enterprise, all started so hopefully ; all ended in

puzzled melancholy. Mr. Hyamson is an Englishman of Jewish faith. He served for some 20 years in the Palestine Government ; he loved Palestine and " the charge committed to British care," and his well-informed history of the Mandatory period covers not only politics, but also Mandatory policy about finance, land, immigration, the social services and security. He writes soberly and his review eloquently illustrates the civilizing work accomplished by the Mandatory Government with notable though hitherto unpublicized and unacknowledged success. We did do a great deal of good in and for Palestine. *Si monumentum quaeris*. But such has been the impetus of Zionist propaganda that all the good achieved there has come to be accredited to Zionist effort only which, as Mr. Hyamson regretfully points out, was all too often concentrated on the discrediting of British achievement, quite forgetful of Britain's traditional sympathy with Jewish well-being—a sympathy which was an example to the world long before the Balfour Declaration of 1917.

One day a book may be written entitled " The British Mandate under the Zionists." Its hero would be the Jewish Agency about which Mr. Hyamson writes with very mixed feelings : the preponderance of its Russian element—an *imperium in imperio* ; its lack of understanding of and later hostility to the British outlook ; its domination by the Jewish Federation of Labour—the *Histadruth*—with its Russian mentality, its armed forces—the *Hagana*—and its control of the Zionist press. Already in 1937, as Mr. Hyamson points out, the Royal Commission was impelled to recommend " that the Jewish Agency should at once *resume* (the italics are mine) active co-operation with the Mandatory " to suppress terrorism and illegal immigration and to maintain law and order for the good of all. The sequel, also quoted by Mr. Hyamson, came six years later when in 1943 Mr. Ben Gurion, now Prime Minister of Israel, told the Palestine Government that

"there would be no co-operation between us and the White Paper authorities neither at present nor after the war." The root of the trouble was, as Mr. Hyamson ably points out, that neither Arab nor Jew would or—in the end—could compromise and that every well-meant though not always happy British move towards an Arab-Jewish compromise was inevitably hailed as yet another British betrayal by one or other or both. Mr. Hyamson as an Englishman, does not spare his Zionist co-religionists for their share in the outcome of 1948 and in the tactics to which they descended in order to secure their way. His outlook towards Arab aspirations is more cautious, but he does not disguise his disappointment that the Arab leaders, too, were so intransigent.

His book will be welcomed by all Englishmen : and though it will not be popular with politically-minded Zionists, they, too, can learn a great deal—about which they are now ignorant—of the long-suffering sincerity and skill of the Palestine Mandatory Administration whose partnership they first welcomed and then spurned.

OWEN TWEEDY.

WHEN GREEK MEETS GREEK, by Sir Reginald Leeper. *Chatto and Windus*. 12s. 6d.

The west has succeeded in Greece not because the communists were not trying, but because the western effort was better planned and better carried out. It is this background of success, still all too rare, which gives Sir Reginald Leeper's book its particular importance. To those whose task it is to plan present and future campaigns against Communism in all three major spheres—military, political and psychological—a study of the struggle in Greece should provide valuable lessons. Sir Reginald Leeper says little of the military aspect—indeed it is clear that he would consider it beyond his function to do so. But on the other two aspects of the struggle his book is by far the most valuable contribution

that has yet been made to the study of the Greek campaign.

The author of *When Greek Meets Greek* was Ambassador during the vital years from 1943 to 1946. In March 1943, when he first presented his letters, King George of Greece and his Government were still in London though on the point of leaving for Cairo. Even at that early stage the Ambassador found himself faced with a situation not untypical of those that developed later—the political voice of British policy, that is the Foreign Office, was giving full support to King George, while the military voice, from G.H.Q. Middle East, was supporting with arms and money the King's worst enemies in the Greek mountains on the grounds that they were fighting the Germans. But that was by no means the most difficult problem that the Ambassador had to face. When the civil war—carefully and laboriously staged by the communist E.A.M.—first broke out in Greece it was touched off by deliberately provoked firing by the city police. This firing, in Constitution Square, took place in full view of the many foreign correspondents who lived in the Hotel Grande Bretagne.

For the correspondents it was a wonderful opportunity for a quick news story. They had their typewriters ready. They had seen the whole story themselves, and comments flowed quickly from their machines. In a few hours the world had the impression that the fascist or near-fascist police of Athens had fired on an unarmed crowd. Those typewriters gave E.A.M. a major victory that day. I saw several correspondents later in the afternoon and told them that if I had reported to my Government sensational news of that character without making quite sure of my facts, I would probably have been sacked.

Sir Reginald does not comment more strongly on this misreporting though it is reasonable to suppose that he felt much that he has thought it unnecessary to say. But the full extent of the damage that was done then (and increased before and after by skilful E.A.M. "republican" propaganda in the United States) was shown when the Americans proclaimed their neutrality

in Great Britain's quarrel with E.A.M. in December 1944. Fortunately the damage has been more than made good by subsequent events.

Sir Reginald Leeper's part in the Greek struggle was of an importance rare in an age when the rôle of the Ambassador in international relations is becoming steadily less dominant. The only criticism that might be made of his narrative is that he has, inevitably, played down the significance of his own work.

GORDON WINTER.

EAST AFRICAN BACKGROUND, by G. W. B. Huntingford and C. R. V. Bell. *Longmans, Green*. 7s. 6d.

AFRICAN IDEAS OF GOD. Edited by Edwin W. Smith. *Edinburgh Press*. 21s.

The ancients observed that there was always something new out of Africa. We are to-day legitimately more concerned with the new things that are going into it, and to seeing that the old things there are not ruthlessly destroyed, but adapted to serve as a basis for a society experiencing inevitable change. The new spirit of tolerance, and the attempt at understanding native peoples, although not by any means politically evident in the whole of the continent, is shown in the many books about Africa now being written. Of the two considered here, one is very general work about a particular part of the continent, and the other a very specialized work about most of it.

East African Background is a primer, and was originally conceived as a sympathetic introduction to the territory for the use of young men, apparently of a low level of general education, necessarily transported there during the war. It is republished, and brought up to date by Mr. Huntingford, presumably for those now proceeding to East Africa on military or administrative jobs, since the tribal lists and text-book format can hardly be expected to tempt the general public. Indeed the literary style is collaborative educational jargon,

and a sentence like "in Tanganyika, we have a variety of political situations" which at first leaves one wondering whether 'we' is the Raj or the men on the spot, is later easily recognizable as merely an example of Demonstrator's English. Africans photograph beautifully, but the illustrations are not impressive. Having swallowed the essentially modest scope of the book, however, anyone who is prepared to read what appears to be extended lecture notes will be rewarded. There is a very fair exposition of the sociological and economic background of East Africa, with an introduction to the language problems and the magico-religious systems. Its very simplicity means that the book is in no way condescending, and it even has a good word to say for the social necessity of the witch-doctor. His position and practices used to be regularly distorted from the pulpit by old-fashioned missionaries, who could not see the wood for the ju-ju trees, and sought for mass conversion from what they robustly considered as black savagery.

The new missionaries are not the same. It is they who contribute—all but one of the twelve are in some sort of Orders—to *African Ideas of God*: a very different sort of book, if even more lavishly illustrated with sentences in the various African dialects. It is the editor's theme, set out in a modest and scholarly introduction, that Africans as a whole have an appreciation of a supreme Godhead, a power above and beyond the ancestors, the local deities and the cultus heroes whom they normally worship. The unexpressed implication is that if this is so then the basis for the understanding of the Christian faith is already in them. With this thesis to work on the contributors, with varying degrees of anthropological objectivity, but always with sincerity and an obvious knowledge of the districts of which they write, present their evidence. The editor very fairly does not sum it up, but leaves it to the reader, who can certainly agree that the case is proved. That is to say, without question

most African tribes do believe in some supreme force outside the ancestors (who as interested parties clearly are not responsible for such disasters as barrenness), and beyond animism. The inner mysticism of most cults sees all gods ultimately as symbols of an inexpressible concept, but names are given—although not always used—for the benefit of the weaker majority. It is closely argued by most of the contributors how far this is theism, or dynamism. Dualism, the conception of a trinity and so on all appear, the more so in the north.

Unfortunately real understanding is still very far off. The language difficulty alone makes the situation appallingly difficult, and it is complicated by the action of the missions themselves. Whereas the early missionaries said that the gods of the peoples they visited were simply devils, the more recent habit has been to identify the most powerfully entrenched local deity with the Almighty. Sometimes a quite secondary god has been so exalted. This means that virtually no new concept presents itself to the African, who is pleased to see his own god now also accepted by the missionary, and meantime himself goes on cheerfully with the preoccupation of ancestorlatri, animism, and necessary magic.

The book however is concerned with presenting the beliefs, not in indicating their developments. If the examples tend to be slightly repetitive, the incidental intelligence is often fascinating, and the African folk legends quoted are delightful. Incidentally one had always doubted that derivation of the word 'voodoo' from a corruption of Vaudois, and it is interesting to learn that *vudu* means 'the gods' in Dahomey and Togo, from which territories many of the original slaves in Haiti were drawn.

The African mind is in a turmoil, and the primitive beliefs are complicated and upset by Christian and Islamic belief. But Africans, certainly, even without these influences, do not worship sticks and stones. They never did.

PENNETHORNE HUGHES.

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THE STORY OF THE PALL MALL GAZETTE, by J. W. Robertson Scott. *Geoffrey Cumberlege: Oxford University Press.* 25s.

The Victorian period has a powerful attraction. Twenty-five years ago it appeared to be peopled by figures of fun: bewhiskered gentlemen and tightly laced ladies whose self-assurance and esteem seemed laughable to those who were alive to see their castle demolished. To-day laughter has changed to admiration. The common theme is that they were giants in those days and by adulation their stature is magnified.

For those who are ready to get their view of the period into perspective Mr. Robertson Scott's "modest contribution to literary, journalistic, social, and political history" is a rare starting point. His admiration for the early makers of the *Pall Mall Gazette*, George Murray Smith and Frederick Greenwood, is heartfelt but they emerge from his scrutiny as men whose daily round was quite as troubled by pin-pricks as our own. Of course they were spared the fear that man in his madness was about to destroy mankind or live in fear of that treachery for more than a generation. But little jealousies and bigger differences troubled them as they do us.

Greenwood, particularly, had many difficulties of character and fortune to combat. He was not always in the right in big things or small; his distrust of Gladstone was exaggerated and his vanity was pronounced. But he was a great editor, a man who won loyalty and kept it long enough to make his time on the *Pall Mall* and the *St. James's Gazette* memorable.

Mr. Robertson Scott makes much of Greenwood's part in the British Government's purchase of the Khedive's Suez Canal shares and too much, I think, of Disraeli's failure to give him credit. One has a feeling that it was ever thus and that much important information has passed from editors of famous newspapers to Governments without public acknowledgment. Cer-

tainly the buying of the Suez shares was a more than ordinary stroke of good fortune but Disraeli's share in the decision to buy was more personal than many actions which win lasting praise or blame for the head of the Government of the time.

The joy of Mr. Robertson Scott's book is its willingness to meander. The times applaud those who roar down the highroads at great speeds with no eyes for the country on either side. Mr. Robertson Scott, though keeping the highroads in sight, enjoys the byways and, as others might, finds there unexpected life.

JOHN ARMITAGE.

WHAT IS LITERATURE ? by Jean Paul Sartre, translated by Bernard Frechtman. *Methuen.* 12s. 6d.

Monsieur Sartre argues with such fluency and momentum that an unwary reader may find himself borne away on a torrent of dialectics. He should keep a firm hold on his critical faculties, for there is much to deserve investigation and comment.

The Socialism of Hugo, says Monsieur Sartre, "was a by-product of bourgeois idealism . . . he was perhaps the only one of our writers who was really popular." One might go further: Hugo's Socialism, even his pauper's funeral, showed a certain inverted snobbery and genius for self-advertisement. He was popular, but the reading public was incomparably wider than it had been in Racine's day. The poor never saw an accurate likeness of themselves in Hugo's work, for he was readily and sometimes sincerely moved, but his characters were always more dramatic than convincing. Then is M. Sartre fair in asserting that Gautier "foolishly confused" the pure presentation of feeling with art for art's sake, or that the Parnassians confused it with artistic imperturbability? Is it not obviously unjust to say that after the Commune, Flaubert's correspondence "abounds in disgraceful abuse of the workers"? Eleven quotations, spread

over a period of three years, would hardly support the assertion ; and it was not, surely, " disgracefully abusive " to write : " I'm worth twenty Croisset voters " ? Against such comments we must weigh *Un Coeur Simple*, and the fact that Félicité is the single endearing character in Flaubert's work, and the only one he has drawn with affection.

About the position of the writer in 1947, M. Sartre is pessimistic. The wireless public for his play *In Camera* " wanted to hear, as usual, the Thursday drama broadcast. As soon as it was over, they forgot it, as they did the preceding ones." Newspaper readers remember a journalist's name because they see it daily like advertisements for soap. The literary digest supplants the unabridged book. The American public culls and discards the flowers of European culture, and " the bourgeoisie . . . has taken on the amorphous and gelatinous aspect which characterizes oppressed classes before they have become conscious of their state." A London club admittedly would be " less suitable " for spreading literary influence than the Parisian salon, if the members did in fact " speak about business, politics, women, or horses, never about literature." But how much do salons affect modern literature in France ? And would Mr. Fry be more of a poet, Mr. Eliot more appreciated, if they were to submit their manuscripts to be tested for *le bon goût* ? The most contentious remark of all appears in another chapter, " Writing for One's Age " : " Books," says M. Sartre, " that are handed down from age to age are dead fruit."

There are a few inconsistencies in translation, but Mr. Frechtman has done a creditable job with a remarkably difficult text. This is a depressing survey, but outside the Athenaeum, and inside, it will certainly provoke discussion.

JOANNA RICHARDSON.

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THE THISTLE AND THE PEN :

Scottish Writing To-day, chosen by
Eric Linklater. *Nelson.* 12s. 6d.

THE SMALL YEARS, by Frank

Kendon. *Cambridge University
Press.* 12s. 6d.

At this time of the year when so many of us are going north there has happily been provided by Mr. Linklater an excellent selection of the work of his fellow-countrymen, so that we may approach them with understanding and perhaps avoid what was the fate of the first Lord Leverhulme when he did not see eye to eye with the men of Lewis. Mr. Colin Macdonald gives us a most entertaining account of what occurred. "Steady work and steady pay," said one of his critics, "are very desirable things. But in Lewis we have never been accustomed to either—and, strange though it must seem to your lordship, we do not greatly desire them."

We are not only given a delightful account by Mr. Moray McLaren of the subtle ways of a West Highland commercial traveller, but we learn from him that one of the best drinks in the world is rum and hot milk. From Mr. Edwin Muir we naturally have great expectations and here they are by no means disappointed, for we are charmed as much by his Scottish memories as by those when, as representative of the British Council, he sojourned in Prague and became acquainted with the ever-regretted Karel Capek. "Curiosity in experiment," says Mr. Norman Douglas, "is the mark of every scholar" and here we have Mr. Douglas at his most urbane; for instance there is the last call he made on his sort of cousin, old James Heywood, when that gentleman was under the impression that Norman was Sir Francis Laking, the doctor. Thinking it best not to deceive him, Norman gravely felt his pulse and proffered some advice. An envelope was then thrust into his hands which, when opened in the street, was found to contain five sovereigns and five shillings, the fee for professional attendance.

Mr. Linklater himself supplies good verse and prose, the latter concerning his famous 'Sealskin Trousers', an episode that would have appealed to Hans Andersen's mermaid. Mr. Neil Gunn has been one of many people's darlings since *The Silver Darlings* exercised their fascination. "God, don't you know how to handle a beast yet?" exclaims a mart man in a tale in this book. But how beautifully does Mr. Gunn handle his language in the two stories here provided. "It's he that has the eyes to see," avers MacPhee in the long contribution of Mr. Compton Mackenzie, who has an eye that nothing worth the telling can escape. Mr. Ivor Brown displays his erudition in so kindly a fashion that we are not ashamed of our ignorance. "When my father," says Mr. Muir, going back to his Orkney days, "told his witch stories we sat up very late." It seems to me that this will happen to the readers of this admirable book.

"Time had ended at the garden hedge," says Mr. Frank Kendon in *The Small Years*; and for the innumerable readers of this classic since it was first published in 1930 the Kentish scene of his childhood has been immune from the ravages of time. "Sometimes," he tells us, "I would go ever so far away from the house, quite to the other side of the lawn, in a brave fear..." Here are the dreams of a sensitive boy delightfully disclosed. There is a chapter, called "Christmas Day", now added to the original number, which demonstrates that Mr. Kendon's heart has not lost its cunning. As for the grandfather and the various other grown-ups who are here immortalized, how splendid for them is their fate, and how splendid for us! Surely there can be few houses that can afford to be without this wonderful book on their shelves. Where else can we find ourselves so thoroughly at home with the young dormice "who have their home in bramble bushes, where they retire, as they think in their foolish, self-centred, half grown-up way, from the world"?

HENRY BAERLEIN.

THE GRASS IS SINGING, by Doris Lessing. *Michael Joseph*. 9s. 6d.

ALL SOULS, by Geraldine Symons. *Longmans*. 9s. 6d.

WHERE NO WOUNDS WERE, by Goronwy Rees. *Chatto & Windus*. 9s. 6d.

In a part of Africa where "to understand the country" means to toe the established line on the native question, the murder of a white woman at the hands of her Negro servant is not an event to excite more than local interest. Like the affair of the Marabar caves in *A Passage to India*, it serves for many as a vindication of the accepted order of things, in which racial division has the weight of a natural principle.

The Grass is Singing is, however, less concerned with the colour question as such than as the context of a particular human tragedy. Its centre is the person of Mary Turner, precipitated into marriage by the fear that her friends consider her not quite "normal". The latter years of her youth have been spent in a town with all the marks of an English suburb, but the new life proves by contrast unfriendly and alien. The heat, the poverty, the loneliness of the veldt, all contribute to the erosion of her character. Worst of all, perhaps, is her inability to deal on any reasonable basis with the native employees of the farm. Long months of lassitude and despair are punctuated by sudden fits of anger, provoked by her husband's impractical schemes of enrichment or by the seeming intractability of the Negroes. The final, fatal turn in her career is reached with the engagement as a native houseboy of a man whom she has formerly ill-treated. By the intrusion of a personal element into a relationship which, if it would survive, must forever remain impersonal and official, she sinks into a fearful infatuation. The borderline of madness has already been crossed when the blow is struck which brings her life to its end.

Perhaps the chief claim to merit of a book which has many is the finely suggested logic of its development. There is a concentration on essentials

which makes each stage in Mary Turner's disintegration seem a natural and necessary consequence of the last. A story which in less able hands might have been grotesque, here achieves complete conviction and credibility.

All Souls, like *The Grass is Singing* a first novel, falls more readily into a familiar class of fiction. It traces the posterity of Jacob Abercorn, an Australian settler, to the early years of the fifth generation and to the middle of the 1939-1945 war. In the process it moves to the China of Victorian expansion and finally to twentieth-century England. Much of it is competently written, but the book as a whole suffers by the compression of its theme within a compass too small to do it justice. Nor does it greatly gain from the commonplace speculations in which some of its characters indulge.

Mr. Goronwy Rees, in a novel which has for its main object the study of a certain type of German mind, takes as his central figure a *Luftwaffe* pilot by the name of Adam Lipansky. Though ranked among his country's foremost airmen, he enjoys the spiritual stature of a brutal and insensitive schoolboy. All this and much more becomes apparent when, after his capture in England, he is forced to suffer a term of solitary confinement. Later he escapes, but he has abandoned his old loyalties without acquiring new ones, and eventually presents himself for arrest. He is essentially a man of action, too stupid and self-centred to concern himself with motive, and ready to be impelled in any direction. The barrenness of his mind is progressively exposed in his exchange with a mysterious interrogator. At first distrustful and hostile, he in time comes to place a curious reliance on the Englishman, as the only point of certainty in a world which has lost its familiar landmarks. Mr. Rees is at his most effective in dealing with this relationship, though its implications remain a trifle obscure. He is less successful in the account of his hero's physical adventures.

JOHN EALES.

BOOKS ON THE TABLE

Guides, philosophers and friends amiably contend for first place here, and they are chosen in that order with every expectation that the last must involuntarily jump the queue.

How to get there

But for the moment, literalness leads the way dressed as a *Blue Guide* to ENGLAND (*Benn.* 21s.). This is the fifth and 1950 edition and, by arm-chair-travel tests, seems to be as comprehensive and practical as all the others under the general editorship of L. Russell Muirhead. Nor are 72 maps and plans, with advice on accommodation (first class hotels providing everything "except perhaps a constant supply of iced water"), money, health (and the boon of free medical attention to visitors), routes, manners (here, it seems, "men do not raise their hats to other men") and transport, its only attractions. It is always readable and the style, necessarily condensed in 700 pages, is not dehydrated; Professor G. Baldwin Brown's historical and artistic study of English monuments deserving much praise. One would think of the book as an indispensable—were it not for the hordes of English sightseers met abroad without guidebook or any previous interest or preparation, deprecatingly or cheerfully admitted, for the wonders before them. It should now be added smugly that the *Blue Guides of Northern and Southern Italy*, 1924 and 1925 editions, were constant and largely contemporaneous companions last year, and will be again next month.

Ave Roma immortalis

Wherefore the next two books are timely; both are called ROME. Edward Hutton's (*Hollis & Carter.* 16s.) is the seventh and enlarged edition of what has become a "standard work". It is indeed one to consult, either in anticipation or in retrospect, on Roman history, past or in the making, and the illustrations are of the kind to make the

heart leap. Though under a lifetime of the city's spell—who having travelled along the Appian Way, will doubt that "you will return changed for ever"?—his critical taste stands unimpaired and his judgments command respect from the bemused, and indeed overwrought, holiday visitor. Particularly helpful is the chapter on Mussolini's Rome to one whose physical eye, at all events, knows no other.—The topographical "fragments in the sun" of Laurence Scarfe's ROME (*Hutchinson.* 12s. 6d.) are conveyed by his own drawings which, however, do not always suggest the spaciousness of the subject; that of the Spanish Steps is an example. But they do admirably indicate "the romantic fusion of past and present." The photographs at the end are quite brilliant in their choices and groupings, as are his little essays throughout. He does particular justice to the fountains: one is inclined to be sorry nowadays for Trafalgar Square loiterers in case they have never seen the fountains of Rome—the Trevi, for instance; but there, when you have thrown in your coin to ensure your return to the city, you participate in the drama of Rome to a degree that leaves Nelson in London exceedingly remote above the spray.

And battles long ago

By no very circuitous route do we thus come to THE BATTLEFIELDS OF ENGLAND (*Methuen.* 21s.) with Alfred H. Burne, so careful, erudite and enthusiastic a guide that G. M. Trevelyan in the Foreword is understandably moved to recommend a holiday spent in motoring to the sites with this "compendious" book. It was certainly a good idea of Colonel Burne's to provide a reasoned and up-to-date account of a scene which stretches from A.D. 500 and the Marlborough Downs where at Badon the Britons under Arthur defeated the Saxons, to Marston Moor and Flodden Field, and south again to Sedgemoor where the last battle was fought on

English soil in 1685. His 32 maps and nine panoramas are of the greatest help in visualizing events for, as he says, the records have been meagre and the ignorance deplorable.

Green and pleasant land

From bloodshed, sorrow and death to the now uncomplicated PLACES OF NATURAL BEAUTY by D. M. Matheson. This is a National Trust Guide (*Batsford*. 8s. 6d.) and, as the author is late secretary of the Trust, readers are assured of a rewarding tour. The many photographs are evocative, or anticipatory, or both, in a way to rouse a proper pride of heritage in forest, moor and cliff, in river, mountain and cove, from the grandiose glories of the Lake District to London's country at Ayot St. Lawrence (with its own grandiose glory aged 94).—And from one rebel to another, and in truth from one Puritan to another, we follow Vera Brittain IN THE FOOTSTEPS OF JOHN BUNYAN (*Rich & Cowan*. 15s.). With vivid, even passionate prose she paints the seventeenth century picture of Bedfordshire, dominated by the struggle between dictatorships and people, as the setting and *raison d'être* of the inspired tinker. In this lightly-shouldered but obviously laborious task she is aided by 56 eloquent and technically excellent illustrations. It is suggested that no child should be urged to tackle *The Pilgrim's Progress* before reading Miss Brittain's book, which seems to be exactly the right kind of preparation so many of us missed. Moreover, she is a corrective to the romantically inclined who, for no other reason, prefer Cavalier to Roundhead.

All kinds of music

True it is of course that

Hearts just as pure and fair
May beat in Belgrave Square
As in the lowly air
Of Seven Dials

as W. S. Gilbert affirmed. He is adequately represented—that is, far short of excessively—in HUMOROUS VERSE, an anthology chosen by E. V.

Knox (*Chatto & Windus*. 6s.). The range is wide ; there are favourites of this generation and the one before, Hilaire Belloc, G. K. Chesterton, A. P. Herbert, A. A. Milne, E. V. Knox himself, among them, and there are Keats and Calverley, Herrick and Hood, Pope and Prior, Raleigh and Rochester, Seaman and Swift, Tennyson and Twain too. As with all such collections, there are regretted omissions and inclusions : Rupert Brooke's "Little Dog's Day" seemed sad rather than funny, to a girl who was perhaps unbearably influenced by what Frances Cornford called "the long littleness" of Brooke's own day, and still raises a sigh rather than a smile. But, on the other hand, there are many pieces, and testifying to the research entailed, which are as new to this reader as they are delightful.

Much the same kind of commending comment might be made on another *Chatto & Windus* anthology, John Hayward's NINETEENTH CENTURY POETRY (6s.). Here are surprises, and old and trusted friends. In choosing to please himself, the editor will on the whole please the reader. The century's sheer output was enormous ; more and greater poets were indeed produced "than in any other similar period in English History" and he has had the commonsense to omit many pieces which are easily accessible elsewhere. One could argue the point about such poems as he names which have been rejected "either because they are so well known, or because they are better known than they deserve to be," but with his aim that the reader must be tempted by such an anthology to fall in love with poetry, there can be no disagreement.—On the poetry which makes the telling of the story the paramount object, M. J. C. Hodgart has written a scholarly and detailed study in THE BALLADS (*Hutchinson's University Library*. 7s. 6d.). Here is a further book in this modest looking series which gives unstinted pleasure. The verse, the music, the history and the folklore of the ballads are discussed, and Child's great collection is drawn upon for examples.

The chapter "Some Ballad Communities" takes the survey much further afield than England and Scotland where it began and in "Ballads and Literature" Professor Hodgart reveals how much the form has given to and taken from what he calls "learned" writing.

Player-dramatist

Even a "ballading knave" could command a great man's ear "when meriting men may either beg or starve" complained the author of *The Hierarchy of the Blessed Angels* which was destined to be overshadowed 30 years later by Milton's *Paradise Lost*. In THOMAS HEYWOOD (*Williams & Norgate*. 8s. 6d.) F. S. Boas makes a selective study of the work of the actor-playwright who belonged to that group of which Shakespeare himself was the head. The aim is to draw attention to the unfamiliar of Heywood's long poems and plays, some of which have never been reprinted. All students, all lovers of Elizabethan literature owe a debt to Dr. Boas for his great and apparently unwearying delvings into that golden age of the drama, and among the good things in this book is a critique of Heywood's "Apology for Actors", which, being addressed to the opponents of the theatre, is in the Greek meaning of the word a *defence* of players, among whom he does not mention the Stratford boy. Yet only Shakespeare "could have been better qualified for the task," because only he had so much practical experience of the stage.

Seen from the stalls

How well qualified is Harold Hobson to write of this is shown again in *THEATRE 2* (*Longmans, Green*. 15s.). This is a play-going journal dating from January 1948 to July 1949 and is a boon to those devotees who are too lazy to keep a diary—as well as their

programmes. Interspersed with his business as a dramatic critic is a good deal of what is known as human interest in stage personalities and doings; so far from this being idle gossip it adorns and points his theme.—The author of *The Modern Theatre* has now distilled its essence in BERNARD SHAW (*Robert Hale*. 12s. 6d.). Eric Bentley manages to compass the 15 reputations which Mr. Shaw has laid claim to, from socialist to teacher, while analysing and "reconsidering" the plays and the Shavian theology. The book is not to be belittled by the use of an overworked word; it stimulates, not merely in the strict dictionary sense but in sending the reader back to the plays themselves—surely the best tribute author (or playwright) could require. As one who was present at the Arts Theatre for the performance of *Heartbreak House* which started at 10.30 p.m. on Mr. Shaw's 94th birthday, I was especially interested in Mr. Bentley's interpretation of that play. The first time I saw it, about fifteen years ago, with Cedric Hardwicke as Captain Shotover, it bewildered; much of the fog had gone, blown away probably by the realities of the last decade, on July 26, 1950.

A plea

On that night, Alec Clunes stressed the duty of remembering the living, and James Bridie, who should know, also told the audience that Bernard Shaw was one of the kindest of men. In television he was plainly acting, and enjoying it, when he waved the cameraman away. Should not his bluff be called, and his dislike of honours be ignored? If necessary, he could be decorated *absente reo*, but what a "royal gesture" if King George VI made the journey to Ayot St. Lawrence! Gilding *this lily* is long overdue.

GRACE BANYARD.